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Abstract
This paper is a study of the history of the transplant of mathematical tools using
negative feedback for macroeconomic stabilization policy from 1948 to 1975 and
the subsequent break of the use of control for stabilization policy which occurred
from 1975 to 1993. New-classical macroeconomists selected a subset of the tools
of control that favored their support of rules against discretionary stabilization
policy. The Lucas critique and Kydland and Prescotts time-inconsistency were
over-statements that led to the dark ages" of the prevalence of the stabilization-
policy-ine¤ectiveness idea. These over-statements were later revised following the
success of the Taylor (1993) rule.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a longitudinal study of the transplant of key ideas and mathematical
tools from negative-feedback control in engineering and applied mathematics to macro-
economic stabilization policy. This movement evolved parallel to the rules versus discre-
tion or stabilization policy ine¤ectiveness controversy from 1948 to 1993. In particular,
we observe a fast transplant of classic control and optimal control to stabilization pol-
icy in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by a long delay to transplant robust control and
stochastic optimal control to optimal state estimation and optimal policy. The paper
re-evaluates the Lucas critique and time-inconsistency argument which contributed to
the bifurcation with diverging paths between control versus the modeling of stabilization
policy by mainstream macroeconomics in the 1970s and 1980s.
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Adam Smith (1776) believed that demand and supply are always self stabilizing due
to a negative feedback mechanism in the private sector. In the 1930s emerged Keynesian
macroeconomic stabilization policy where the policy maker uses negative feedback mech-
anisms with monetary or scal policy instruments. Friedman (1948) started the rules
versus discretion controversy, when he proposed scal rules that do not vary in response
to cyclical uctuations in business activity, so that it is the private sectors negative-
feedback mechanism that stabilizes the economy, and not the policy maker. He dened
discretion as Keynesian state contingent policy where the policy instruments change
with respect to the deviation of policy targets from their set points. Discretionary policy
was used in the US in the 1950s and 1960s, and the proponents of rules were losing in
the controversy during these two decades.
In parallel to the development of Keynesian stabilization policy, the eld of applied
mathematics and engineering developed the tools of classic control during 1930-1955 (Ben-
nett (1996)). This eld gains maturity and autonomy while creating a world association
with a rst IFAC conference in 1960. Between 1955 and 1990, it has an impressive and
fast rate of new discoveries: optimal control, optimal state estimation with Kalman lter,
stochastic optimal control, robust optimal control, Nash and Stackelberg dynamic games.
These discoveries were readily applied for many devices with numerical algorithms using
the development of computers at the time. Aström and Kumar (2014) survey the research
eld of control which is based on negative-feedback rules stabilizing a dynamic system:
Feedback is an ancient idea, but feedback control is a young eld... Its
development as a eld involved contributions from engineers, mathematicians,
economists and physicists. It represented a paradigm shift because it cut
across the traditional engineering disciplines of aeronautical, chemical, civil,
electrical and mechanical engineering, as well as economics and operations
research. The scope of control makes it the quintessential multidisciplinary
eld. (Aström and Kumar (2014), p. 3)
There was a strong demand for control tools for rm-level planning and for macroeco-
nomic stabilization policy in the 1960s (Kendrick (1976), Kendrick (2005), Neck (2009)
and Turnovsky (2011)). Barnett describes the related controversies surrounding the
model of the Federal Reserve Board in the 1970s (Barnett and Serletis (2017)):
The policy simulations were collected together to display the policy target
paths that would result from various choices of instrument paths. The model
was very large, with hundreds of equations. Some economists advocated re-
placing the menu book of simulations with a single recommended policy,
produced by applying optimal control theory to the model. The model was
called the FMP model, for Federal Reserve-MIT-Penn, since the origins of the
model were with work done by Franco Modigliani at MIT and Albert Ando at
the U. of Pennsylvania, among others. That models simulations subsequently
became an object of criticism by advocates of the Lucas Critique. The alter-
native optimal control approach became an object of criticism by advocates
of the Kydland and Prescott (1977) nding of time inconsistency of optimal
control policy. (Barnett and Serletis (2017), p. 7-8)
The Lucas (1976) critique and Kydland and Prescotts (1977) time-inconsistency argu-
ment convinced a su¢cient number of macroeconomists that, although negative-feedback
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mechanism and optimal control should be used for modeling the private sector, negative-
feedback mechanism and optimal control cannot be used for stabilization policy by macro-
economists and practitioners of monetary and scal policy.
In the 1970s, Lucas, Kydland and Prescott, labeled as new classical macroeconomists,
took sides for rules in the rules versus discretion controversy. On the one hand, incor-
porating control tools into macroeconomics was obviously a scientic progress, and new
classical macroeconomists invested heavily, like Keynesian macroeconomists, in learning
these tools in the 1960s. On the other hand, control tools were supporting negative-
feedback mechanism driven by policy makers, hence discretion. Therefore, the tools of
control were pivotal in the rules versus discretion controversy.
E¢cient multi-disciplinary research tools can be imported from one eld of research
to another one. However, the scientists in the eld of arrival are free to bias their choice
of the tools to be imported from the eld of origin, if they are taking side in a scientic
controversy. This selection bias entails the risk of the inconsistency of the imported subset
of tools with respect to the eld of origin.
The new-classical economists put forward their normative rational expectations theory
with theoretical demonstrations using a Kalman lter. They claimed it is impossible to
estimate parameters of the transmission mechanism when there is reverse causality of
the feedback rule. The new-classical economists suggested importing time-inconsistency
into dynamic games. They simulated models using the linear quadratic regulator for the
private sector. All these approaches are using tools from the eld of control.
But, in addition, following the complete guidelines of the eld of control where the
accuracy of the measurement of the transmission mechanism is a key element, they could
have attempted the falsication of their theory estimating parameters with a Kalman
lter. They could have attempted to devote a lot of resources to identication strategies
when facing reverse causality in systems of equations. They could have determined opti-
mal feedback policy based on these estimation of state variables using stochastic optimal
control. They could have searched for a policy that could be robust to some ranges of
uncertainty on parameters of the transmission mechanism.
But using these tools would have been inconsistent with their research agenda where
they were taking sides in a scientic controversy. They biased the use of some tools of
control in order to support their prior view on the side of rules in the controversy. The
temporary success (for two decades) of their selection bias restricted the demand and
delayed the use of the tools of control for stabilization policy.
This helps to reconsider how, in order to convince a su¢ciently large subset of the
community of macroeconomists, the authors rhetorically generalized some valid state-
ments of their papers stretching them to extreme conclusions, which, in turn, were false
statements.
The Lucas critique (1976) over-stated that it is impossible to identify parameters in a
dynamic system of equations with reverse causality. Despite the Lucas critique, Kydland
and Prescott (1982) over-stated that the US economy during 1950-1979 behaved as if
stabilization policy had never been implemented (policy instruments were pegged) or as
if the policy instruments did not have an e¤ect on policy targets. Kydland and Prescott
(1977) over-stated that policy makers credibility can never be achieved using negative-
feedback rules according to optimal control.
Simulations using private sector micro-economic foundations and auto-regressive ex-
ogenous shocks were rhetorically presented as the magical scientic solution to answer
the Lucas critique, to avoid time inconsistency and to describe business cycles data.
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These rhetorics marginalized or delayed for at least a decade attempts to model sta-
bilization policy transplanting the new tools of robust optimal control facing parameter
uncertainty and stochastic optimal control with feedback rules reacting to estimates of
state variables using a Kalman lter with macroeconomic time-series. This outcome is
labeled dark ages by Taylor (2007):
But after this urry of work in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a sort of
dark age for this type of modeling began to set in. Ben McCallum (1999)
discussed this phenomenon in his review lecture, and from the perspective
of the history of economic thought, it is an interesting phenomenon. As he
put it, there was a long period during which there was a great falling o¤ in
the volume of sophisticated yet practical monetary policy analysis". (Taylor
(2007))
In order to explain the selection of tools imported from control on behalf of the new-
classical macroeconomist side in the rules versus discretion controversy, our method is
to use as a reference model the simplest model of control. We translate the mathematical
arguments of the most cited papers in this controversy into the framework of this single
model. This helps to understand how di¤erent denitions of discretion and how di¤erent
hypothesis on the persistence of the policy targets in the transmission mechanism matter,
even though they were not highlighted so far in the history of the rules versus discretion
controversy.
The structure of this study is as follows:
Section 2 frames the original classical economists view of self-stabilizing markets in
the framework of Ezekiels (1938) Cobweb model. Friedmans (1948) and Kydland and
Prescotts (1977) rules versus discretion controversy is presented in the framework of the
simplest rst order single-input single-output model of control.
Section 3 documents the fast transplant of classic control from Phillips (1954b) and
resurrection with the Taylor (1993) rule. It mentions the fast transplant of optimal con-
trol to stabilization policy in the 1960s and of a Kalman lter for rational expectations
theory. By contrast, It mentions the very limited use of Stochastic Optimal Control us-
ing simultaneously Kalman-lter estimations for determining optimal stabilization policy
in the linear quadratic Gaussian model. Finally, it emphasizes the long delay before
transplanting robust control, dealing with the uncertainty on parameters.
Section 4 re-evaluates the claim of the Lucas (1976) critique that it is impossible to
identify the parameters of the transmission mechanism when there is reverse causality
due to a negative-feedback rule. The Lucas critique is not resolved by microeconomic
foundations, by Sims (1980) vector autoregressive models, by Kydland and Prescotts
(1982) real business cycle, nor by Lucas (1987) welfare cost of business cycles. Kydland
and Prescott (1977) section 5 has a specic denition of discretion assuming a Lucas
critique bias, which is not related to time-inconsistency.
Section 5 re-evaluates the time-inconsistency argument and the impossibility of pol-
icy makers credibility leading to the impossibility to use negative feedback grounded by
control. Firstly, it credits time-inconsistency to Simaan and Cruz (1973b) rst contri-
bution with Kydland (1975, 1977), Calvo (1978) and Kydland and Prescott (1980) as
followers. Secondly, it highlights that the inationary bias in Barro and Gordons (1983)
static model is distinct from Calvos (1978) dynamic time-inconsistency.
Section 6 explains how Taylor (1993) rhetorically translated Friedmans (1948) rules
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versus discretion controversy in his Semantics section to the advantage of the negative-
feedback mechanism of his Taylor rule.
Section 7 concludes that the rules versus discretion controversy on macroeconomic
stabilization policy biased and delayed the e¢cient transfers of knowledge from another
eld of research (the eld of control), and by doing so, it delayed scientic progress.
2 Rules versus Discretion and Control
2.1 Self-Stabilizing Markets: Smith (1776) and Ezekiels (1938)
Counter-Example
The main underlying disagreement of the debate starting with Friedmans (1948) rules
versus discretion and continuing with the new-classical macroeconomists attack against
stabilization policy during the 1970s and 1980s, is the question which forces stabilize
the economy. Relating this to optimal control, i.e. nding a control law such that an
objective function is optimized in a dynamical system, the question is whether it is the
private sectors behavior alone that leads to an economic equilibrium or whether there
is a need for economic policy in the form of government intervention. As a prominent
example, optimal control of the private sector, using negative feedback, stabilizes the
markets in Kydland and Prescotts (1982) business cycle model.
As has been noted by Mayr (1971) it is even possible to interpret Adam Smiths (1776)
self-regulating local stability of supply and demand market equilibrium as a negative-
feedback mechanism.
When the quantity brought to market exceeds the e¤ectual demand, it
cannot be all sold to those who are willing to pay the whole value.... Some
part must be sold to those who are willing to pay less, and the low price which
they give for it must reduce the price of the whole. (Adam Smiths (1776,
chapter 7))
Mayr (1971), however, did not relate his control translation of Smith to the Cobweb
model (Ezekiel (1938)). In the Cobweb model, the deviation of the market price pt from
its natural (equilibrium) price p is a decreasing function of excess supply, the di¤erence
between supply xst and demand x
d
t :
pt   p = F
 
xst   xdt

with F < 0:
Conversely, the di¤erence between the market price and the natural price is the signal
that tells the producer whether to increase or decrease his production. Excess supply
increases with the price, including a time lag to adjust supply:
xst+1   xdt+1 = B (pt   p) with B > 0:
Excess supply does not depend on its own lagged value xst xdt . There is no persistence
of excess supply in the case where the price is set to its equilibrium value: pt = p
.
If at any time it [the supply] exceeds the e¤ectual demand, some of the
component parts of its price must be paid below their natural rate. If it is
rent, the interest of the landlords will immediately prompt them to withdraw
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a part of their land; and if it is wages or prot, the interest of the labourers
in the one case, and of their employers in the other, will prompt them to
withdraw a part of their labour or stock from this employment. The quantity
brought to market will soon be no more than su¢cient to supply the e¤ectual
demand. (Adam Smiths (1776, chapter 7))
Smith concludes that this feedback mechanism implies that market prices tends to-
wards the natural equilibrium price:
The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the
prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. Di¤erent accidents
may sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes
force them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles
which hinder them from settling in this center of repose and continuance, they
are constantly tending towards it. (Adam Smith (1776, chapter 7))
As opposed to Smiths (1776) intuition, however, the convergence result in the Cob-
web dynamics is only valid under a specic condition for price elasticities of supply and
demand:
xst+1   xdt+1 = BF
 
xst   xdt

requires   1 < BF < 0:
Feedback can bring local stability (negative feedback) or local instability (positive
feedback) within the private sector. Although Ezekiel (1938) does not cite Smith (1776),
he uses the same word (gravitate) for describing classical economic theory:
Classical economic theory rests upon the assumption that price and pro-
duction, if disturbed from their equilibrium tend to gravitate back toward
that normal. The cobweb theory demonstrates that, even under static con-
ditions, this result will not necessarily follow. On the contrary, prices and
production of some commodities might tend to uctuate indenitely [case
BF =  1], or even to diverge further and further from equilibrium. [case
BF <  1] (Ezekiel (1938), p. 278-279)
When BF = 0 (F = 0 or B = 0) the adjustment towards the equilibrium following an
excess supply or excess demand shock takes only one period. The demand-rst equation
can be interpreted as a proportional feedback rule, where the price plays the role of
the feedback-policy instrument of the private sector. Since the Cobweb model assumes
zero open-loop persistence of supply, if the price elasticity of demand and therefore the
parameter F was to be chosen optimally, it would be set to an innite elasticity (F = 0).
Then the optimal policy of the private sector is to peg the price at its optimal value
pt = p
.
2.2 Positive versus Negative Feedback in a First-Order Two-
Inputs Single-Output Linear Model
Before going into details on the rules-versus-discretion controversy in the next section, we
will clarify the concepts of positive and negative feedback and their relation to control-
lability and local stability. For this we introduce explicitly a policy maker and consider
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the monetary policy transmission mechanism as a rst-order two-inputs single-output
linear model as used in dynamic games (Simaan and Cruz (1973a)). First-order stands
for one lag of the policy target in the transmission mechanism. The rst input is a policy
instrument decided by the private sector (for example output or consumption xt). The
second input is a policy instrument decided by the policy maker (for example, nominal
funds rate it). The single output or single policy target can be ination t (instead of
the price level pt in the cobweb model). The policy target and the policy instruments are
are written in deviation of their long run equilibrium values:
t+1 = A
0t +B
0xt +Bit + "t with A
0  0, B0 6= 0, B 6= 0, 0 given. (1)
Additive disturbances are denoted "t and are assumed to be identically and independently
distributed. If B0 6= 0, the private sectors policy instrument is correlated with the
future value of the policy target. Then, this rst-order linear model is Kalman (1960a)
controllable by the private sector. If B 6= 0, the policy makers policy instrument is
correlated with the future value of the policy target. Then, this rst-order linear model
is Kalman (1960a) controllable by the policy maker.1 Both, the private sector and the
policy maker behave according to proportional feedback rules given by:
xt = F
0t and it = Ft with F
0 2 R and F 2 R. (2)
In a rst step, substituting the private sectors feedback rule in the transmission mecha-
nism implies:
t+1 = At +Bit + "t where A = A
0 +B0F 0 . (3)
For A0 and B0 given and if the values of the policy instrument xt are not constrained (for
example by a endowment constraint), the private sector can choose any real value for F 0
and therefor also for A0 +B0F 0. As a consequence Ett+1 can take any target value.
Consider the case where the policy maker pegs its policy instrument to its long run
value (it = 0). As we never measure negative auto-correlation for macroeconomic time
series, we can assume that A  0. We also never measure zero auto-correlation (no
persistence) for macroeconomic time series. Nonetheless, we also consider the case of
zero persistence A = 0 in this paper, because it played a crucial, but unnoticed role in
the rules versus discretion controversy. Then, three outcomes are possible for the private
sectors feedback:
Case 1 A = A0 +B0F 0 = 0 for F 0 =  A
0
B
. The value of the private sectors feedback rule
parameter F 0 implies no persistence of the policy target following a random shock without
persistence.
Case 2 0 < A = A0 + B0F 0 < 1 for  A
0
B
< F 0 < 1 A
0
B
if B0 > 0. The value of the
feedback rule parameter F 0 implies persistence with stationary dynamics of the policy
target following a random shock without persistence.
Case 3 A = A0 + B0F 0  1 for F 0 > 1 A0
B
if B0 > 0. The value of the feedback rule
parameter F 0 implies a diverging trend with non-stationary dynamics of the policy target
following a random shock without persistence.
Negative feedback and positive feedback mechanism are dened in the following way:
1As a reminder, a model exhibits Kalman controllability if the policy instruments have a direct or
indirect e¤ect on the policy target.
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Denition 1 Negative-feedback rule parameters F 0 are such that 0  A0 + B0F 0 < A0,
which implies B0F 0 < 0.
Since any disturbance automatically causes corrective action in the opposite direction,
the parameters B and F have opposite signs.
Denition 2 Positive-feedback rule parameters F are such that 0  A0 < A0 + B0F 0,
which implies B0F 0 > 0.
Proposition 1 Negative feedback does not imply local stability for the private sectors
policy-rule parameters F 0 such that 0  1 < A0+B0F 0 < A0. The requirement for negative
feedback and local stability is therefore that the private sectors policy-rule parameter F 0
satises: 0  A0 + B0F 0 < min (A0; 1). Conversely, positive feedback does not imply local
instability for the private sectors policy-rule parameters 0  A0 < A0 +B0F 0 < 1.
In a second step, the policy maker chooses A = A0 + B0F 0 and B. Substituting the
policy makers feedback-rule in the transmission mechanism implies:
t+1 = (A+BF )t + "t. (4)
For A and B 6= 0 given and if the values of the policy instrument are not constrained
(for example by a zero lower bound for funds rate) so that the policy maker can choose
any real value for F , the policy maker can target Ett+1 at any real value because he can
choose any real value A+BF .
The condition for the policy makers negative-feedback and stabilizing policy-rule
parameters is given by the set of parameters F satisfying: 0  A+BF < min (A; 1).
2.3 Rules versus Discretion
Even though the main focus of the paper is the period after 1948, it is worth mentioning
Simons (1936) article on rules versus authorities as a predecessor of the literature on
policy rules. According to Simons (1936), authorities are not necessarily only related to
a policy makers negative-feedback behavior, but also to any random or erroneous policy
makers decision, such as Gold standard rules or trade wars. First of all, a 100% reserve
requirement should be set so that private banks and shadow banks cannot create money.
This would eliminate the nancial instability due to a banking crisis. Secondly, a rigid
public rule on central bank public creation of money should be xed. Thirdly, free market
competition in the real sector should prevail.
Based on these ideas, Friedman (1948) denes rules versus discretion as follows:
[For government expenditures excluding transfers,] no attempt should be
made to vary expenditures, either directly or inversely, in response to cyclical
uctuations in business activity. ... The [transfer] program [such as unem-
ployment benets] should not be changed in response to cyclical uctuations
in business activity. Absolute outlays, however, will vary automatically over
the cycle. They will tend to be high when unemployment is high and low
when unemployment is low. (Friedman (1948), p. 248)
8
In addition to Simons (1936) 100% reserve requirements by private nancial insti-
tutions, Friedman (1948) also advocated zero public debt and allowed money supply to
move cyclically in order to nance cyclical decits or surpluses. He shifted to a xed
money-supply growth-rate rule in Friedman (1960): The stock of money [should be] in-
creased at a xed rate year-in and year-out without any variation in the rate of increase
to meet cyclical needs. Rules can be Friedmans (1960) xed k-percent growth rate of
money supply (mt = 0), no public decits (st = 0), an interest rate peg (it = 0), or an
exchange rate peg (et = 0). These denitions are the same as in Kydland and Prescott
(1977). They will change, however, at the end of the 1970s (see section 6). Using our
framework, rules are dened as follows:
Denition 3 A policy maker follows a Rule whenever he pegs his policy instruments to
their steady state values (F = 0 and it = 0), with policy target dynamics t+1 = At+ "t.
Condition 1 In order to have stable dynamics for the policy target with Rules, the
private sector always decides to stabilize the value of the policy-rule parameter F 0: 0 
A0 +B0F 0 < 1 (case 1 and case 2).
One could interpret this behavior of the private sector as Smiths (1776) implicit
hypothesis of market clearing.
Negative-feedback counter-cyclical scal policy evolved with Keynes (1936) General
Theory and the idea that the equilibrium is not automatically reached by market forces
alone, but that there exist situations where a government intervention is necessary.
Denition 4 Discretion is a policy that responds to cyclical uctuations of the devia-
tions of the policy variables from their long run target values (it = Ft with F 6= 0), with
policy target dynamics t+1 = (A+BF ) t + "t.
Condition 2 In order to have stable dynamics for the policy target and policy makers
negative-feedback, the policy maker decides policy rule parameter F to satisfy 0 < A +
BF < A < 1 in case 2, or to satisfy 0 < A + BF < 1 < A in case 3. In case 1,
0  A + BF  A = 0, a discretionary policy with BF 6= 0 adds persistence with respect
to a policy pegging the policy instrument to its long run value (F = 0): negative-feedback
cannot be achieved with F 6= 0.
Using the above framework, table 1 summarizes distinctive features of the rules versus
discretion (1948-1993) controversy.
Table 1: Rules versus Discretion, Stabilization Policy Ine¤ectiveness ver-
sus Negative-feedback Controversy (1948-1993).
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Rules, Laissez-faire Discretion
Policy Ine¤ective E¤ective
Proponents Friedman, Barro, Gordon Phillips, Taylor
Fischers label Inactive (Passive) Activist
Feedback No feedback, Peg Negative feedback
Rule it = Ft = 0 with F = 0 it = Ft with F 2 Dnf
Transmission t+1 = At +Bit + "t t+1 = At +Bit + "t
Controllability Not necessary: B 2 R Necessary: B 6= 0
Optimal A = 0 A > 0
Phillips curve Static: A = 0 Accelerationist: A = 1
Dynamics Ett+1 = A
t0 Ett+1 = (A+BF )
t 0 < A
t0
Target t
persistence
condition
Private sector
necessarily stationary
dynamics: 0  A < 1
0  A+BF < min (A; 1)
BF < min (0; 1  A)
F opposite sign of B
Lucas critique A not a function of F A+BF function of F
Time inconsistent Static model: irrelevant Time inconsistent if t jumps
Control label Open loop Closed loop
Prominent supporters of the rules side are Friedman (1948, 1960) and Barro and
Gordon (1983a and b). Their implicit assumption is case 1 (A = 0) and static models
without lags of the policy target (Blanchard and Fischer (1989), p.581). Barro and
Gordon (1983a and b) consider a static Phillips curve (A = 0).
Prominent supporters of the discretion side are Phillips (1954b), Taylor (1993,
1999). They implicitly assume a dynamic model with trend (case 3: A > 1) and possibly
with stationary persistence (case 2: 0 < A < 1). In case 2, persistence A is not too
small so that the reduction of persistence subtracting BF < 0 is not negligible. Taylor
(1999) and Fuhrer (2010) consider an accelerationist Phillips curve (A = 1), which may
be related to trend ination in the 1970s in the USA. Volckers discretionary monetary
policy during 1979-1982 reversed non-stationary trend ination into stationary ination
0  A+BF < 1  A. The rule parameter F is a bifurcation parameter, for given values
of the parameters A and B of monetary policy transmission mechanism.
In control theory, the policy responses are always conditional on the transmission
mechanism. It does not make sense to put forward a policy rule without specifying the
policy transmission mechanism. For Nelson (2008, p.95), Friedman and Taylor agreed "on
the specication of shocks, policy makers objectives and trade-o¤s. Where they di¤ered
was on the extent to which structural models should enter the monetary policy decision
making process."
3 The Transplants of Control Tools from Engineer-
ing to Stabilization Policy
Smith did not refer to engines as an analogy when he explained the negative-feedback
mechanism in the Wealth of Nations (see Mayr (1971)) even though he knew Watt and
engineers machines using negative-feedback. The concept of negative feedback was used
by economist most of the time without a reference to engineers techniques until classic
control emerged. With respect to the modeling of macroeconomic stabilization policy
during the period of the rules versus discretion controversy 1948-1993, there have been
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three stages of implementation of control theory according to Zhou, Doyle and Glover
(1996) and Hansen and Sargent (2008). The rst one is classic control without a loss
function in the 1950s, with proportional, integral and derivative (P.I.D) policy rules. The
second one is optimal control including a quadratic loss function with a Kalman linear
quadratic regulator, optimal state estimation with a Kalman lter and stochastic optimal
control merging both methods with the linear quadratic Gaussian model in the 1960s.
The third stage is robust control which takes into account uncertainty on the parameters
of the policy transmission mechanism in the 1980s.
3.1 The Fast Transplant of Classic Control
Tustin (1953), an electrical engineer at the University of Birmingham, mentions to have
started in 1946 applying classic control methods used in electrical systems to Keynesian
macro-models (Bissell (2010)). Phillips (1954a), an electrical engineer hired at the Lon-
don School of Economics, wrote a two page book review on Tustin (1953) in the Economic
Journal. He built the hydraulic computer MONIAC (Monetary National Income Ana-
logue Computer) in 1949 (Leeson (2011)). The MONIAC is a series of connected glass
tubes lled with water where the ow represented GNP and the feedback system repre-
sented the use of monetary and scal policy. Phillips (1954b (from Phillips PhD) and,
1957) used proportional, integral and derivative (P.I.D.) rules of classic control to stabilize
an economic model using negative-feedback mechanism (Hayes (2011)). Taylors (1968)
master thesis merged Phillips (1961) model of cyclical growth with Phillips (1954b) pro-
portional, integral and derivative negative-feedback stabilization rules. Thirty-nine years
after Phillips (1954b) and twenty-ve years after Taylors (1968) P.I.D rules, the Taylor
(1993) rule is a proportional (P) feedback rule of classic control. Taylor, in Leeson and
Taylor (2012)), explains why he took sides with discretion:
I viewed policy rule as a natural way to evaluate policy in the kinds of
macroeconomic models which I learned and worked on at Princeton and Stan-
ford. It was more practical than philosophical or political. (Leeson and Taylor
(2012))
We now highlight how classic control takes sides with discretion: The policy maker
targets his preferred persistence of the time-series of policy targets, which determines his
preferred speed of convergence of these policy targets to their long run equilibrium. For
example, a central bank could do an ination persistence targeting of an auto-correlation
of ination of 0:8, satisfying a stability and negative feedback condition: 0   =
A + BF  = 0:8 < min(A; 1). This decision is called in classic control pole placement,
because  is a pole or a zero of the polynomial at the denominator of the Laplace transform
of the closed-loop system.
Accordingly, the policy maker decides on a policy rule parameter F  = 

 A
B
= 0:8 A
B
in the case of a proportional feedback rule. For example, if there is a negative marginal
e¤ect of the funds rate on ination (B < 0), the policy rule F  is an a¢ne decreasing
function of the ination persistence target .
Taylors (1999) transmission mechanism is an accelerationist Phillips curve (where xt
is the output gap and a is the slope of the Phillips curve) and an investment saving (IS)
equation:
t+1 = t + axt, a > 0 and xt =  b(it   t), b > 0: (5)
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So that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is such as A = 1 + ab > 1:
t+1 = (1 B) t +Bit with B =  ab < 0: (6)
The Taylor principle states that the funds rate should respond by more than one to
deviation of ination from its long run target (F > 1). The Taylor principle corresponds
to the classic control condition for negative-feedback rule parameters such that 0 <
A+BF < min(1; A), for models such that B < 0 and A = 1 B > 1 (Taylor (1999)):
0  A+BF = 1 B +BF < 1 and B < 0) 1 < F <  B
A
=   B
1 B: (7)
The upper bound condition on F corresponds to zero persistence of ination.
3.2 The Fast Transplant of Optimal Control
The second step in the transfer of methods used in engineering to economic modeling
is the introduction of optimal control in the 1950s, see Duarte (2009) and Klein (2015).
In optimal control, a quadratic loss function is minimized subject to linear dynamic
equations. Using a certainty-equivalence property, normal disturbances with zero mean
can be added to the model according to Simon (1956) and Theil (1957).
In the 1950s, Simon, Holt, Modigliani and Muth came to the Graduate School of
Industrial Administration at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in Pittsburgh. Holt
had come from an engineering background at M.I.T. and Simons father was an electrical
engineer after earning his engineering degree in Technische Hochschule Darmstadt.2 (Lee-
son and Taylor (2012)). They applied control methods to microeconomics by computing
variables for production, inventories and the labor force of a rm. Optimal linear decision
rules from linear quadratic models were computed for specic economic models of rms
production by Holt, Modigliani and Simon (1955) and Holt, Modigliani and Muth (1956),
(Singhal and Singhal (2007)). Holt (1962) developed an optimal control model to analyze
scal and monetary policy.
Kalman (1930-2016), an electrical engineer, wrote the key paper for solving linear
quadratic optimal control (linear quadratic regulator, LQR).3 He extended the static
Tinbergen (1952) principle, namely that there should be as many policy instrument as
policy targets, to a dynamic setting. Kalmans (1960a) controllability denition is such
that a single instrument can control for example three policy targets, but in three di¤erent
periods (Aoki (1975)). Masanao Aoki (1931-2018) was a Japanese professor of engineering
at UCLA and California, Berkeley from 1960-1974, before switching elds to economics.
Kalmans (1960a) linear quadratic regulator sets the solution of stabilization policy facing
a quadratic loss function solving matrix Riccati equations. Textbooks include Sworder
(1966) and Wonham (1974) among others.
The di¤usion of control techniques to macroeconomics was complementary to the
development of large scale macroeconomic models:
Professor Bryson was o¤ering a course in the control theory in 1966 that
caught the attention of a small group of economics graduate students and
2Phillips and Taylors fathers were also engineers, (Leeson and Taylor (2012)
3He was invited to participate in the world econometric congress in 1980 in Aix en Provence, but his
paper was not published in Econometrica. He later received the highest honor of US science, the US
medal of science in 2009.
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young faculty members at Harvard... Rod Dobell, Hayne Leland, Stephen
Turnovsky, Chris Dougherty, Lance Taylor and I persisted... Two control
engineers who had shifted their interest to economics  David Livesey at
Cambridge University and Robert Pindyck at MIT  developed macroeco-
nomic control theory models (in 1971 and 1972).... In May of 1972, a meeting
of economists and control engineers was arranged at Princeton University by
three economists (Edwin Kuh, Gregory Chow and M. Ishaq Nadiri) and a con-
trol engineer. The meeting which was attended by about 40 economists and
20 engineers was to explore the possibility that the application of stochastic
control techniques, which had been developed in engineering, would prove to
be useful in economics as well (Athans and Chow, 1972).... Another British-
trained control engineer, Anthony Healy, who was teaching at the University
of Texas at the time, took an interest in economic models and applied the use
of feedback rules to a well-known model that had been developed at the St.
Louis Federal Reserve Bank (FRB). (Kendrick (2005), p. 7-8)
In the ongoing debate discretion versus rules, optimal control  with a policy
maker minimizing a loss function  was used by macroeconomists in favor of discre-
tion, whereas those in favor of rules model the private sectors optimal behavior with
stationary policy targets (0 < A = A0+B0F 0 < 1). Nonetheless, even in this case, optimal
control by the policy maker is still able to decrease the loss function further.
Optimal control is lling a gap in the pole placement method of classic control
where the criterion for choosing the persistence  of the policy target is not explicitly
stated (0 <  = A+BF  < 1). Kalmans optimal control uses a quadratic loss function
with the possibility of discounting future periods with a factor  and non-zero quadratic
cost of changing the policy instrument, R > 0, in order to ensure concavity. The relative
cost of changing the policy instrument (R=Q) represents e.g. central banks interest-rate
smoothing or governments tax smoothing. In the case of the private sector, it corre-
sponds to households consumption smoothing or rms adjustment costs of investment.
Maximize
  1
2
+1X
t=0
t
 
Q2t +Ri
2
t

, with R > 0, Q  0 and 0 <   1; (8)
subject to the same transmission mechanism as the one of classic control.
Solving this linear quadratic regulator yields two roots of a characteristic polynomial
of order two, one of them stable, the other one unstable. For this reason, Blanchard
and Kahn (1980) call this solution saddlepath stable, in a space which adds co-state
variables (Lagrange multipliers) and state variables (policy targets). This implies that
the dynamics of the state variables is stable, exactly like in classic control.
Optimal persistence  is a continuous increasing function of the relative cost of
changing the policy instrument: 

R
Q

. The relation between the persistence of the
policy target and policy-rule parameter, A + BF  = , is the same for optimal control
as for classic control. Unless the targeted persistence does not belong to the interval:
 2
i
0;min

A; 1
A
h
, a simple rule derived from classic control with an ad hoc targeted
persistence  is observationally equivalent to an optimal rule 

R
Q

, with identical
predictions and behavior of the policy maker. A reduced form of a simple rule parameter
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F corresponds to an optimal rule F

R
Q

with preferences R
Q
. There exist preferences of
the policy maker that rationalize an estimated value of a simple rule parameter F to
be a reduced form of an optimal rule parameter F

R
Q

.
Proposition 2 A rule pegging the policy instrument (i = 0, F = 0) is optimal for a
quadratic loss function (which is bounded if: A2 6= 1), with a rst-order single policy
makers instrument single-policy-target transmission mechanism:
(i) for stationary persistence of the policy target 0 < A < 1=
p
 and for a zero weight
(Q = 0) on the volatility of the policy target in the policy makers loss function.
(ii) for zero persistence of the policy target A = 0 and a positive weight Q  0 of the
volatility of the policy target in the loss function.
Proof. (i) With zero weight on the policy target (Q = 0), the relative cost of changing
the policy instrument is innite (R=Q! +1), which corresponds to maximal inertia of
the policy. Only the rst of these two cases allows F  = 0. In the second case, F  = 0
corresponds to A2 = 1 with unbounded utility (see appendix).
0  F  = 
   A
B
  A
B
, if 0 < A <
1p

, B < 0, 0 <   1:
1
A
  A
B
 F  = 
   A
B
  A
B
, if A >
1p

and B < 0, 0 <   1:
If the feedback parameter is zero (F = 0), optimal policy corresponds to a rule
(i = 0). The policy target dynamics t = At 1 is not taken into account in the
expected loss function.
(ii) For A = 0 and for B 6= 0, the system is controllable with a non-zero e¤ect of the
policy instrument on the policy target:
Min
 
Q2t +Ri
2
t 1

subject to: t = Bit 1 )Min

Q+R
1
B2

2t

:
For each period with identical repeated optimizations, a rule (i = 0 = ) is the optimal
solution, whatever the magnitude of the relative cost of changing the policy instrument
R=Q > 0.
The weakness of static analysis, however, was stated by Phillips (1954b) in a seminal
paper on stabilization:
The time path of income, production and employment during the process
of adjustment is not revealed. It is quite possible that certain types of policy
may give rise to undesired uctuations, or even cause a previously stable
system to become unstable, although the nal equilibrium position as shown
by a static analysis appears to be quite satisfactory. (Phillips (1954a, p.290))
Rules are optimal for a static model A = 0, but in a dynamic model where A  1,
rules lead to instability and huge welfare losses. In addition, the hypothesis A = 0 cannot
explain the observed persistence of all macroeconomic time series, which are stationary
if 0 < A < 1 or non-stationary if A  1. It cannot explain the variations of the non-
zero persistence of ination (A + BF > 0), such as the acceleration of ination or the
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disinationary period during 1973 to 1982 with observed changes of the Feds policy
behavior during Volckers mandate.
Optimal policy (rules) in a repeated static model of the transmission mechanism
(A = 0, as with e.g. a Phillips curve) is never a modeling shortcut with results extended
by analogy to optimal policy in dynamic models of the transmission mechanism (A  1,
as with e.g. an accelerationist Phillips curve or a new-Keynesian Phillips curve) where
discretion is optimal.
The above proposition for rules is bad news for the proponents of rules because
rules are sub-optimal in dynamic models with policy makers using optimal control.
Therefore, it was top of the research agenda of the proponents of rules in the contro-
versy with discretion (that is, the opponents of Keynesian stabilization policy) to seek
opportunities in order to add distortions in order to "prove" that optimal control tech-
niques could not be used by policy makers for stabilization policy.
In addition, the above proposition renders useless Friedman (1953) results recently
put forward by Forder and Monnery (2019) as a contribution for his Nobel prize. He
considers the simplest static model for the policy transmission mechanism:
CL = OL + i:
The policy target randomly deviates from its zero equilibrium value with the value
OL if the policy instrument i is set to zero (open loop). After a change of the policy
instrument i, the closed loop value of the policy target is equal to CL. The policy makers
loss function is the volatility of the closed loop policy target 2CL . The loss function is
obviously minimized 2CL = 0 for this optimal negative feedback rule: i =  OL, which
implies CL = 0, iOL =  1 and i = OL . Friedmans (1953) condition for sub-optimal
negative feedback rules is obtained after substitution of the transmission mechanism in
the loss function:
2CL = 
2
OL
+ 2i + 2iOLi < 
2
OL
)  1  iOL <  
1
2
i
OL
:
Friedman (1953) discusses verbally the e¤ect of lags of the transmission mechanism.
His mathematical formulation of the model, however, has no lags. As mentioned by
Phillips (1954b), a negative feedback rule for a static model can drive instability in a
dynamic model.
3.3 A Conict between the Kalman Filter and Stochastic Op-
timal Control?
Additionally to the linear quadratic regulator (LQR, Kalman (1960a)) Kalman developed
a lter-estimate that recursively takes in each period the new data of the current period
into account (Kalman (1960b)). This lter is used, for example, in the global positioning
system (GPS) since its inception in 1972.
It is tting that at the conference [1st world IFAC conference, Moscow,
1960] Kalman presented a paper, On the general theory of control systems
(Kalman, 1960) that clearly showed that a deep and exact duality existed be-
tween the problems of multivariable feedback control and multivariable feed-
back ltering and hence ushered in a new treatment of the optimal control
problem. (Bennett, 1996, p. 22).
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Optimal trajectories derived from the linear quadratic regulator (LQR) and optimal
state estimation using Kalmans lter for linear quadratic estimation (LQE) were unied
in the linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) system. It is one of the main tools of Stochastic
Optimal Control, see Stengel (1986) and Hansen and Sargent (2008). The Kalman lter
has been quickly implemented in rational expectations theory, even though an insu¢cient
emphasis on measurement can be observed.
The transplant of stochastic optimal control and the Kalman lter to macroeconomics
was very fast. For example, during his Ph.D. (1973) in Stanford, Taylor participated in
seminars that discussed books linking control and time-series, such as Whittles (1963)
Prediction and Regulation or Aokis (1967) Optimization of stochastic systems, see Leeson
and Taylor (2012). Hansen and Sargent (2007) conrm:
A protable decision rule for us has been, if Peter Whittle wrote it, read
it. Whittles 1963 book Prediction and Regulation by Linear Least Squares
Methods (reprinted and revised in 1983), taught early users of rational ex-
pectations econometrics, including ourselves, the classical time series tech-
niques that were perfect for putting the idea of rational expectations to work.
(Hansen and Sargent (2008), p. xiii)
Independently of Kalman (1960b), Muth (1960) updated conditional expectations
based on new information in a simple model. Hansen and Sargent (2007) highlight that
Muth (1960) is a particular case of Kalmans (1960b) lter estimation. In the early 1970s,
following Muth (1960), Lucas solved several rational expectations models using variants
of a Kalman lter (Boumans (2020)). Most of the time, Lucas used a Kalman lter as a
tool for solving theoretical models of rational expectations, instead of using it for what
the Kalman lter is designed for in the eld of control, namely the practical empirical
estimation of the state variables and of the parameters of the transmission mechanism
using time series.
Based on the observations of a few Lucas papers in the early 1970s and following
Sent (1998), Boumans (2020) infers that engineering mathematics did not unify optimal
trajectories and optimal state estimation, whereas they were in fact unied in the early
1960s in stochastic optimal control:
Engineering mathematics, however, is not one and unied eld. This pa-
per shows that the mathematical instructions come from informational math-
ematics, which should be distinguished from control engineering. (Boumans
(2020)).
It may appear that the Kalman lter and stochastic optimal control are distinct ap-
proaches because Lucas used a Kalman lter in theoretical papers in the early 1970s
and later dismissed stochastic optimal control for policy makers in the Lucas (1976)
critique. In basic engineering textbooks, such as Stengel (1986), however, optimal trajec-
tories (Boumans (2020) control engineering) and optimal state estimation including
the Kalman lter (Boumans (2020) informational mathematics) are merged into sto-
chastic optimal control:
Not surprisingly, the control principle of chapter 3 and the estimation
principles of chapter 4 can be used together to solve the stochastic optimal
control problem. (Stengel (1986), p. 420)
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This articial split between policy makers optimal trajectories and optimal state
estimation done by Lucas was in practice driven by the rules versus discretion controversy.
This explains Lucas change of perspective and tools. Optimal control, and especially
stochastic optimal control with a policy maker reestimating in each period the optimal
policy is clearly a method favored by macroeconomists in the camp discretion. Hence,
Lucas, as a proponent of rules, took the opportunity to break the dual approaches
unied by stochastic optimal control in two parts. The advocacy of particular theoretical
views taking sides in a controversy and the selection of mathematical tools from control
goes hand-in-hand. Scientic tools are part of the scientic rhetorics in order to convince
a majority of scientists to opt for one side of the controversy.
The present study, then, provides a rationalization for rules with smooth
monetary policy, exactly as did the earlier studies of Lucas, Sargent and
Wallace, and Barro. Similarly, it rationalizes the analogous scal rule of
continuous budget balancing and rules to stabilize the quantity of private
money, such as larger reserve requirements for banks. (Lucas (1975), p. 1115)
Barnett (2017) identies the di¤erent emphasis on measurement as the main method-
ological di¤erence between rocket science and macroeconomics, with both elds using
control methods. William A. Barnett had a BS degree in mechanical engineering from
MIT in 1963. He worked as an rocket scientist at Rocketdyne from 1963 to 1969, a
contractor for the Apollo program. He then got a Ph.D. in statistics and economics from
Carnegie Mellon University in 1974 at the same time as Finn Kydland. He worked for
the models of the Fed soon after.
The di¤erent emphasis on measurement is very major, especially between
macroeconomics and rocket science... In real rocket science, engineers are
fully aware of the implications of systems theory, which emphasizes that small
changes in data or parameters can cause major changes in system dynamics.
The cause is crossing a bifurcation boundary in parameter space... But when
policy simulations of macroeconometric models are run, they typically are run
with the parameters set only at their point estimates. For example, when I was
on the sta¤ of the Federal Reserve Board, I never saw such policy simulations
delivered to the Governors or to the Open Market Committee with parameters
set at any points in the parameter estimators condence region, other than
at the point estimate. This mind-set suggests to macroeconomists that small
errors in data or in parameter estimates need not be major concerns, and
hence emphasis on investment in measurement in macroeconomics is not at
all comparable to investment in measurement in real rocket science. (Barnett
(2017), p.22)
Lucas, Kydland and Prescott did not increase the emphasis on measurement with
respect to modelers at the Fed in the 1970s. They had prior theoretical views taking sides
for rules in the debate on rules versus discretion. As well as optimal control, using a
Kalman lter for optimal state estimation using macroeconomic time series would give
a chance to challenge these prior views. Hence, it was a rhetorical strategy in the rules
versus discretion controversy to challenge measurement and identication strategies.
Lucas (1976) presented as impossible the econometric identication of parameters
in the case of reverse causality due to feedback rules. When confronting their model
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with data, Kydland and Prescott (1982) decided not to use Kalman-lter optimal-state
estimations and avoid identication issues, but did simulations. The increased distance
between econometricians and new-classical macroeconomists with respect to identication
issues in econometric estimations using a Kalman lter, led to a selection bias with respect
to the tools and the practice of control. In the eld of control, the measurement of the
transmission mechanism is viewed as much more important than theoretical models based
on a priori hypothesis taking sides in a controversy. This increased the gap between the
macroeconomics of stabilization policy and the eld of control in the 1980s.
Kalman, who worked for the Apollo program, emphasized that the most important
issue for stabilization of dynamic systems is the accuracy of the measurement and the
estimation of parameters of the system of policy transmission mechanism (A and most
importantly B and its sign) instead of a priori modeling of the real world. For Kalman,
measurement is above all necessary for optimal policy rules, so one should not separate
ltering estimation with data from optimal trajectories found with control. One should
not separate macroeconomic theory from econometrics using macroeconomic time-series.
By contrast, the linear quadratic gaussian (LQG) system merging optimal policy and
Kalman lter e¤ective estimation with macroeconomic time series has not been widely
used during the the 1980s.
3.4 The Delayed Transplant of Robust Control
The third stage of control theory, namely robust control (Zhou et al. (1996), Hansen and
Sargent (2008)), emerged in the following of Doyles (1978) two-pages paper presenting
a counter-example where the Kalman linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) model has not
enough guaranteed margins to ensure stability.
Robust control assumes that the knowledge of the transmission parameters is uncer-
tain on a known nite interval with a given sign. In our example, it may correspond to
Bmin < B < Bmax < 0. An evil agent tries to fool as much as possible the policy maker,
which reminds of Descartes (1641) evil demon:
I will suppose therefore that not God, who is supremely good and the
source of truth, but rather some malicious demon, had employed his whole
energies in deceiving me. (Descartes (1641))
The policy maker is the leader of a Stackelberg dynamic game against the evil agent.
The policy maker is minimizing the maximum of the losses in the range of uncertainty on
the parameters. Kalmans solutions of matrix Riccati equation for the linear quadratic
regulator remain instrumental for nding the solutions of robust control.
For monetary policy, the uncertainty on parameters was put forward by Brainard
(1967), so that, indeed, this is a very important issue. But the transplant of the new
methods of robust control was delayed in the 1980s. Very soon after robust control tools
emerged, Von Zur Muehlen (1982) wrote a working paper applying robust control to
monetary policy which was never published in an academic journal. No major conference
took place between leaders in the eld of robust control and renowned macroeconomists
like the ones described by Kendrick (1976) for stochastic optimal control in the early
1970s. Instead of at most three years for the spread of new tools from the eld of control,
one had to wait until the end of the 1990s, more than fteen years. For now two decades,
Hansen and Sargent (2008, 2011) transplanted robust control tools into macroeconomics
(Hansen and Sargent (2008)), with still a limited number of followers in macroeconomics:
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When we became aware of Whittles 1990 book, Risk Sensitive Control
and later his 1996 book Optimal Control: Basics and Beyond, we eagerly
worked our ways through them. These and other books on robust control
theory like Basar and Bernhards H1 Optimal Control and Related Minimax
Design Problems: A Dynamic Game Approach provide tools for rigorously
treating the sloppy subject of how to make decisions when one does not
fully trust a model and open the possibility of rigorously analyzing how wise
agents should cope with fear of misspecication. (Hansen and Sargent (2008),
p. xiii)
The explanation of the delay for the transplant of robust optimal control is that
the policy ine¤ectiveness arguments spread and took over for a while among inuential
macroeconomists, according to Kendrick (2005):
However, it was a problem in the minds of many! As a result, work on
control theory models in general and stochastic control models in particular
went into rapid decline and remained that way for a substantial time. In my
judgment, it was a terrible case of throwing the baby out with the bath water.
The work on uncertainty (other than additive noise terms) in macroeconomic
policy mostly stopped and then slowly was replaced with methods of solving
models with rational expectations and with game theory approaches.... I
believe that the jury is still out on the strength of these e¤ects and think
that there was a substantial over-reaction by economists when these ideas
rst became popular. (Kendrick (2005), p.15)
We now re-evaluate the Lucas critique and the time-inconsistency theory that are at
the origin of the long delay for using robust control methods and the relative scarcity of
applied macroeconometric estimations using a Kalman lter jointly with optimal policy
with the linear quadratic Gaussian model.
4 The Impossibility to Identify the Parameters of the
Policy Transmission Mechanism
4.1 Lucas (1976) Critique
In popular terms, the Lucas critique states that (Keynesian) macroeconomic relations
change with government policy. The Lucas critique is a parameter identication problem
in a system of dynamic equations including reverse causality due to a feedback control
rule equation. The model of the last section of the paper of the Lucas critique (Lucas,
1976) can be stated in the form of the rst-order single-input single-output model. We
add our notations of the previous sections in brackets in the Lucas (1976) quotation. The
corresponding notations are: for the policy target: yt = t, for the policy instrument:
xt = it, and for the parameters of the transmission mechanism:  = (A;B) which also
includes additive random disturbances "t. In order to avoid confusion with the control
notation F for the policy rule parameter, we change Lucas notation of function F (:) into
D(:):
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I have argued in general and by example that there are compelling empir-
ical and theoretical reasons for believing that a structure of the form
yt+1 = D (yt; xt; ; "t) [our notation: t+1 = At +Bit + "t]
D (:) known,  xed, xt arbitrary will not be of use for forecasting and policy
evaluation in actual economies... One cannot meaningfully discuss optimal
decisions of agents under arbitrary sequences fxtg of future shocks. As an al-
ternative characterization, then, let policies and other disturbances be viewed
as stochastically disturbed functions of the state of the system, or (paramet-
rically)
xt = G (yt; ; t) [our notation: it = Ft + t]
where G is known,  is a xed parameter vector, and t a vector of distur-
bances. Then the remainder of the economy follows
yt+1 = H (yt; xt;  () ; "t) [or t+1 = (A+BF ) t + "t +Bt]
where, as indicated, the behavioral parameters  [or A + BF ] vary system-
atically with the parameters  [or F ] governing policy and other shocks.
The econometric problem in this context is that of estimating the
function  () [or A + BF ]. In a model of this sort, a policy is viewed as a
change in the parameters  [or F ] or in the function generating the values of
policy variables at particular times. A change in policy (in  [or F ]) a¤ects
the behavior of the system in two ways: rst by altering the time series be-
havior of xt; second by leading to modication of the behavioral parameters
 () [or A+BF ] governing the rest of the system. (Lucas (1976, p.39-40))
The closed loop parameter (A+BF ) determines the persistence of policy targets. It
depends on the policy rule parameter F as in all closed loop models including feedback
mechanism in the eld of control. The econometric problem is the identication of para-
meters A, B and F in a system of dynamic equations with reverse causality. In addition,
in the scalar case, the true parameters B and F have opposite signs for the case of a
negative-feedback mechanism (BF < 0).
Lucas (1976) over-stated that this parameter identication problem cannot in princi-
ple be addressed.
The point is rather that this possibility [of feedback rules] cannot in prin-
ciple be substantiated empirically. (Lucas (1976, p.41))
Because the identication of estimates of A and B cannot in principle be substantiated
empirically, then it is better to use rules such as it = 0 and F = 0 instead of discretion
with a feedback rule parameter F 6= 0.
This reverse-causality parameter identication problem is identical to the one of the
private sectors demand and supply price elasticities with respect to quantities, when there
is negative feedback of supply on demand (section 2.1, Smith (1776) and Ezekiels (1938)
cobweb model). The supply of goods should increase when price increases, whereas the
demand of goods should decrease when price increases. But there is only one covariance
for observed prices and quantities with a single sign.
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According to Koopmans (1950), the identication of B and F nding opposite signs
can in principle be substantiated empirically, if one nds strong and exogenous instrumen-
tal variables with distinct identication restrictions for both the transmission mechanism
(demand) and the feedback equation (supply). Finding these instrumental variables with
their identication restrictions is far from being easy with macroeconomic data. One an-
swer is instrumental variables allowing identication via identication restrictions such as
exogenous monetary policy shocks, exogenous ination shocks or lags of some explanatory
variables in vector autoregressive (VAR) models which include policy-target (ination)
and policy-instrument (funds rate) equations or lags of explanatory variables.
Although Lucas (1976) does not mention microeconomic foundations, it is often er-
roneously claimed that microeconomic foundations are required because of the Lucas
(1976) critique. From private sectors demand and reverse causality of supply with neg-
ative feedback, the private sectors behavior estimates of elasticities are also subject to
the Lucas (1976) critique. If the private sectors behavior is modeled with microfounda-
tions (section 3.2, intertemporal optimization using optimal control), the representative
households behavior includes an optimal policy-rule equation F 0 besides the law of mo-
tion of the private sectors state variables with parameters (A0; B0) as in section 2.3. The
Lucas critique applies as well: there is a system of two equations with reverse causality
and opposite signs for these two parameters: B0F 0 < 0. The private sector persistence
parameter A0 + B0F 0 is not a structural parameter. Therefore, private sectors micro-
foundations are never an answer to the parameter identication problem of the Lucas
(1976) critique. Dynamic models of the private sector alone face also the Lucas critique,
even without policy intervention where BF = 0 using section 2.3 notations.
Lucas rhetorical over-statement was successful, according to Blinders interview in
July 1982 reported in Klamer (1984):
This is a case where people have latched upon a criticism. All you have
to do in this country (more than in other places) right now is scream mind-
lessly, Lucas critique! and the conversation ends. That is a terrible attitude.
(Klamer (1984), p.166)
Instead of fostering a research agenda on identication issues with reverse causality
in applied econometrics, it convinced a number of macroeconomists that applied macro-
econometrics was to be dismissed and hopeless. Macroeconomic theorists favored theory
with the private sectors microeconomic foundations using simulations, instead of tackling
thorny identication issues in econometrics.
4.2 Sims (1980) faces the Lucas critique: The VARPrice Puzzle
for Identifying B and F with Opposite Signs
Several Keynesian applied econometricians, including Blinder, investigated the stability
of reduced form estimates A+BF without nding much change on several key equations
from 1960 until 1979 or 1982 (Goutsmedt et al. (2019)). But it is possible to have
unchanged reduced form persistence parameters, even when the structural parameters
did change from period 1 (before 1973) to period 2 (after 1973): A1+B1F1 = A2+B2F2.
The di¢cult step is to identify separately A, B and F for each period, knowing that
there is a reverse causality with opposite signs (BF < 0) of the policy instrument and
the policy target in the transmission mechanism (parameter B), on the one hand, and in
the policy rule (parameter F ), on the other hand.
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The Lucas critique was used as an explanation for the forecasting errors of large scale
models such as the FMP model, for Federal Reserve-MIT-Penn. Another critique of large
scale forecasting models was put forward by Sims (1980) with his vector auto-regressive
models (VAR). Sims (1980) warned that some identication restrictions (for example,
constraining some parameters to be zero) were not tested in macroeconometrics in the
1970s.
But soon an unexpected anomaly of VAR models appeared, labeled the price puzzle
(Rusnák et al. (2013)). We highlight that the VAR price puzzle is closely related to
the Lucas (1976) critique. Impulse response functions obtain that ination increases,
following a shock increasing the funds rate. This is the opposite estimate of the expected
sign of the true model: bB > 0 > B. Indeed, impulse response functions are such that
the funds rate increases, following a shock increasing ination, with the expected sign:bF > 0. The identical sign for bB and bF comes from the fact that the sign of the covariance
between the policy instrument and the policy target does not change with one or two
lags. The price puzzle is such that bB > 0 and bF > 0, so that there seems to be a positive
feedback mechanism on ination persistence of policy bA+ bB bF > A, even during Volckers
disinationary policy with negative-feedback mechanism.
Estimating the correct sign of B is of utmost importance for policy advice. Negative
feedback reduces the persistence of the policy target according to the condition: 0 <
A + BF < A. This implies BF < 0. The sign of F should be the opposite of the sign
of B. If one estimates wrongly that bB > 0 whereas its true value is B < 0, the policy
advice will be F < 0, so that bBF < 0 < BF . Therefore, the policy advice will wrongly
increase the persistence of the policy target:
0 < A+ bBF < A < A+BF if wrong estimated sign B < 0 < bB: (9)
Several econometric techniques have been used to reverse the sign of the price puzzle
(Rusnák et al. (2013)). Perhaps some of them correctly managed to answer the Lucas
(1976) critique for some data set. Walshs (2017) textbook restricts the description of the
price puzzle measurement issue to half a page. Walshs (2017) textbook demonstrates that
it has been easier to develop a large variety of theoretical micro-founded macroeconomic
models conicting among themselves than to provide accurate measurements of A, B and
F .
4.3 Kydland and Prescott (1982) face the Lucas critique
For a representative agent of the private sector, Ramsey (1928) models a negative-
feedback mechanism for optimal savings or optimal consumption xt with consumption
smoothing (related to the notations R=Q for the linear quadratic approximation). This
idea was formalized again independently by Cass, Koopmans and Malinvaud in 1965
(Spear and Young (2014)). Kydland and Prescott (1982) stuck to this idea adding auto-
correlated productivity shocks zt.
Their model is a stock-ow reservoir model where the stock of wealth or the stock of
capital kt has an optimal set point k
 (De Rosnay (1979), Meadows (2008)). The stock
of capital is controlled by saving/investment inows and it faces depreciation outows.
If the level of the stock is below its long run optimal target, consumption decreases
proportionally according to a negative feedback proportional rule:
xt = F
0kt + F
0
zzt, kt+1 = (A
0 +B0F 0) kt + (A
0
kz +B
0F 0z) zt with 0 < A = A
0 +B0F 0 < 1 ,
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where both the consumption ow and the capital stock are written in deviation from
their long run target. Consumption also responds to an exogenous auto-correlated pro-
ductivity shock zt. To become rich, a poor representative households with capital below
its long run target (kt < 0) only needs to save more which implies his optimal consump-
tion is below its long run target (xt < 0). Hence, the poor representative household
replenishes his reservoir storing his stock of wealth to its optimal level (kt = 0).
When the relative cost of changing consumption (R=Q) increases, the policy rule pa-
rameter decreases (consumption is less volatile) and the persistence of capital or wealth
increases A or equivalently, the speed of convergence of capital towards equilibrium de-
creases.
Kydland and Prescott (1982) send us back to Smiths (1776) view that a negative-
feedback mechanism always works within the private sector with supply and demand in-
teraction. This time, the negative-feedback mechanism is related to the investment/saving
market. It is a typical model including microeconomic foundations which faces the Lucas
critique4:
(1) There exists a problem of parameter identication due to a private sector reverse
causality feedback rule. In particular, it is di¢cult to nd properly identied opposite
signs for optimal behavior of the private sector with negative feedback such that: B0F 0 <
0.
(2) They assume and do not test the identication restrictions such that BF = 0.
They assume that there is no transmission mechanism of macroeconomic policy (B =
0) and no policy makers feedback rule (F = 0). This amounts to consider that the
autocorrelation of the policy target A + BF is exogenous. But, if one does not test
whether BF = 0 or not, one cannot exclude BF 6= 0 so that the persistence of the
policy target is a reduced form parameter which depends on the policy rule parameter F
according to A+BF . This is exactly the Lucas (1976) critique, as highlighted by Ingram
and Leeper (1990):
Kydland and Prescotts model assumes that policy doesnt a¤ect private
decision rules. There is no policy evaluation to perform. Alternatively, if
policy does a¤ect private behavior, then the parameters Kydland and Prescott
calibrate are reduced-form parameters for some underlying model embedding
monetary and scal policy. Thus, if there is any policy evaluation left to
perform, Kydland and Prescotts calibrated parameters must be functions of
policy behavior and should change systematically with policy. (Ingram and
Leeper (1990), p. 3)
Kydland and Prescott (1982) have chosen simulations and calibrations in order to
avoid the econometric measurement of A0, B0, F 0, B, and F . To solve and simulate
their model, Kydland and Prescott (1982) used Kalman (1960a) LQR solutions of a
Riccati equation. Without Kalmans (1960a) solution of optimal control for the private
sector, real business cycles would not have been computed. Lucas selected a Kalman
lter for his theoretical papers, but rejected optimal control for policy makers doing
discretion, Lucas (1976). Kydland and Prescott (1982) selected optimal control for
the private sector only, but rejected Kalman lter estimations. Because Kydland and
4Sergi (2018) provides the history of the Lucas (1976) critique in relation to real business cycles
models and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models which followed Kydland and Prescott (1982)
paper.
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Prescott (1982) expected their model to be rejected by econometrics, they decided to
avoid a measurement strategy based on a Kalman lter, as opposed to researchers in
the eld of control. Behind this seemingly inconsistent use of tools of control by Lucas
and Kydland and Prescott, there remains a common motive: support rules in the rules
versus discretion controversy. Write complicated and technical papers, imported from
the tools of control, with a crucial hypothesis (here BF = 0) which handicaps policy
makers negative-feedback discretion with respect to rules.
Only when we have considerable condence in a theory of business cycle
uctuations would the application of public nance theory to the question
of stabilization be warranted. Such an extension is straightforward in the-
ory, though in all likelihood carrying it out will be di¢cult and will require
ingenuity. (Kydland and Prescott (1988), p. 358)
In relation to Kydland and Prescotts (1982) restriction BF = 0 of no stabilization
policy during post-war business cycles, Blinder states in an interview in July 1982:
One important aspect to the debate is how stable an economy would be
without an active government... Look at a time series chart (in my stagation
book) of the year-to-year uctuations of GNP. They are remarkably smaller
in the 50s and 60s, the Keynesian years, than they were before... I claim I
know why: that there was active scal and monetary policy to iron business
cycles beginning after World War II, but not before. So I think discretionary
policies have been used and they have often worked. (Klamer (1984), p. 165)
Lucas (1987) conrms Blinders observations for the case of consumption time series,
which has in general lower volatility then GNP:
In the period prior to the Second World War, and extending as far back in
time that we have usable data, the standard deviation (logarithmic deviations
from trend) of consumption was about three times its post-war level. (Lucas
(1987), p. 28)
Although Simons (1936) and Friedmans (1948) 100% reserve requirement for banks
was not enacted, the 50s and 60s were decades without banking crisis following the Glass-
Steagall act of 1933, separation of investment and retail banking and the Bretton Woods
conference, 1944, with capital controls and international nancial stability. Financial
regulation and high productivity growth are likely to have been complementary to active
stabilization policy in order to damp business cycles uctuations during these two decades.
4.4 Lucas (1987) faces the Lucas critique
Lucas (1987, chapter 3 and 2003) evaluates the cost of aggregate US consumption uc-
tuations by its certainty equivalent loss of consumption. He uses the second order Taylor
development of a discounted separable utility function with constant relative risk aversion
of the representative household. This certainty equivalent is one half of the coe¢cient of
absolute uctuations aversion (or relative risk aversion)  times the variance of the log
of U.S. aggregate consumption around its trend denoted 2x. Lucas (1987) considers the
following range of estimates b for the coe¢cient of constraint relative risk aversion:
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2x with 1  b < 20 and bx = 0:013:
Lucas (1987) is the transcript of Yrjö Jahnsson lecture in May 1985 and Lucas (2003)
is the transcript of January 2003 presidential address at the American Economic Associ-
ation, eighteen years after for the same evaluation. Lucas (1987) evaluates the certainty
equivalent cost of post Second World War uctuations of consumption to $8:50 year 1983
per person ($22 year 2019). This is an extremely low cost. But it is also a conservative
estimate of welfare because Lucas (1987) utility does not include the leisure benets
during recessions due to reduction of working hours which partially o¤sets the loss of
consumption in Kydland and Prescotts (1982) utility. Lucas (1987, p.28) mentions I
would guess that taking leisure uctuations into account more carefully would reduce the
estimate in the text still further.
Lucas (1987) low estimate of the variance of detrended consumption 2x since the
Second World War faces the Lucas critique for the following reason: It is a reduced-form
estimate 2x which depends on stabilization policy parameters F . For example, if the log
of U.S. aggregate consumption around its trend is a stationary autoregressive process of
order one, its variance decreases if there is negative feedback due to stabilization policy.
xt = (A+BF ) xt 1 + "t and 0 < A+BF < min(A; 1)
2x =
2"
1  (A+BF )2 <
2"
1  A2 if 0 < A < 1 and BF < 0:
Lucas (1987) notes the di¤erence of the volatility of consumption before and after
Second World War:
Fluctuations in the pre-Second World War, especially combined as they
were with an absence of adequate programs for social insurance, were asso-
ciated with large cost of welfare... In the period prior to the Second World
War, and extending as far back in time that we have usable data, the stan-
dard deviation (logarithmic deviations from trend) of consumption was about
three times its post-war level. Since this number is squared in the formula
(8), the implied cost estimates are multiplied by nine, becoming like one-half
of 1 per cent of total consumption. As deadweight losses go, this is a large
number. (Lucas (1987), p.28)
But he does not attribute the change of the volatility of consumption 2x to the changes
of the policy-rule parameter F related to the introduction of Keynesian stabilization
policy. His conclusion therefore may face the Lucas (1976) critique:
I nd the exercise instructive, for it indicates that economic instability at
the level we have experienced since the Second World War is a minor problem,
even relative to historically experienced ination and certainly relative to the
costs of modestly reduced rates of economic growth (Lucas (1987), p. 31).
Blinders argument (interview in July 1982 in Klamer (1984)) is to compare the US
economy after the Second World War with stabilization policy (BF < 0) to the US
economy before this period without stabilization policy (with e.g. BF = 0). One would
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have saved up to 8 times the cost of consumption uctuations using Lucas (1987) utility
and estimates: $68 year 1983 ($175 year 2019) per person, still a small benet. Then,
Blinder (1987) changes the scale of Lucas evaluation of the cost of post-war-II US business
cycles as follows:
Now change the utility to the Stone-Geary form: U = log(C   $1500).
Here, a 4 percent drop in consumption reduces utility by 8.3 percent... Finally,
let the cycle instead reduce the consumption of 10 percent of the population
by 40 percent while the other 90 percent loses nothing. (Note I am allowing
very generous unemployment insurence here.) With the Stone-Geary utility
function, mean utility declines 16.1 percent. (Klamer (1984), p. 165)
Since then, the great nancial crisis in 2007 and its jobless recovery changed the
gures of the standard error of US detrended aggregate consumption since the Second
World War. Twenty-two years after Lucas Yrjö Jahnsson lecture in 1985, Barro (2009)
uses Epstein-Zin-Weill utility for a representative agent and estimates that economic
disasters with at least 15% loss of GDP over several consecutive years has a frequency of
2% for 35 countries during the 20th century:
Society would willingly reduce GDP by around 20 percent each year to
eliminate rare disasters. The welfare cost from usual economic uctuations
is much smaller, though still important, corresponding to lowering GDP by
about 1.5 percent each year. (Barro (2009))
4.5 Kydland and Prescott (1977, section 5): Systematic Bias of
Estimated Parameters
Following the Lucas (1976) critique, because the identication of estimates of A and B
cannot in principle be substantiated empirically, then it is better to use rules where
it = 0 and F = 0 instead of discretion with a feedback rule parameter F 6= 0. Accord-
ingly, Kydland and Prescott (1977) set a new denition of discretion where the policy
maker always measures the parameters of the transmission mechanism with cumulated
systematic errors which nally leads to the instability of the policy target.
Denition 5 A discretionary policy is a policy for which the policy rule is optimal under
the incorrect assumption that the observed persistence of the policy target is invariant to
the policy-rule parameter used in the previous period.
The policymaker uses control theory to determine which policy rule is
optimal under the incorrect assumption that the equilibrium investment
function is invariant to the policy rule used... Econometricians revise their
estimate of the investment function, arguing that there has been structural
change, and the policymaker uses optimal control to determine a new policy
rule. (Kydland and Prescott (1977), section 5).
To describe the private sector, a model with convex adjustment costs of investment
is used. Because of the optimal behavior of the private sector, rules pegging the policy
instrument to its long-run value (where it = 0 and F = 0) has stable dynamics (0 <
A = A0 + B0F 0 < 1). For optimal taxation, the policy makers instrument is investment
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tax credit. Because A 6= 0 and Q 6= 0, rules are sub-optimal with respect to optimal
control discretion by the policy maker obtaining unbiased estimates of the policy rule
parameter A (section 3.2). Assuming an increasing bias of the policy-rule parameter A,
Kydland and Prescotts (1977) simulations lead to the increased volatility of the policy
target in the discretion case when compared to the rules case:
For one example (...), after the third iteration, however, performance de-
teriorated, and the consistent [optimal control] policy to which the process
converged was decidedly inferior to the passive policy for which the invest-
ment tax credit was not varied... For another example, the iterative process
did not converge. Changes in the policy rule induced ever larger changes in
the investment function. The variables uctuated about their targeted values
but uctuated with increased amplitude with each iteration.... Such behavior
either results in consistent but suboptimal planning or in economic instability.
(Kydland and Prescott (1977), p. 485)
We translate their argument using the rst order single-input single-output model.
In each period, the policy maker uses A+BFt 1 instead of A for determining his policy
rule parameter Ft at the current period. The policy makers sets an optimal policy Ft
which belongs to the stability set for the erroneous A0 = A + BFt 1. This implies that
the sequence of policy-rule parameters Ft is strictly increasing or decreasing:
j(A+BFt 1) +BFtj < A < 1 ) jBj jFt 1   Ftj < 0:
After some iterations up to a date t1, the discretionary policy rule Ft may belong
to a set with a larger persistence jA+BFtj and volatility of the policy target than the
one obtained with rules (where it = 0 and F = 0) persistence equal to A:
jA+BFtj > A, for t > t1:
Because the policy maker estimates with an increasing bias the open-loop persistence
A of the policy target, discretion implies higher volatility of the policy target than rules.
This result does not assume rational expectations with forward-looking variables, nor
time-inconsistency in a Stackelberg dynamic game, which is dened in the next section.
5 The Impossibility of PolicyMakers Credibility and
therefore of Optimal Control.
5.1 Simaan and Cruz (1973b) Time-Inconsistency of Stackel-
berg Dynamic Games
Kydland and Prescotts (1977) expressed their dislike of discretionary policy in the ab-
stract of their famous paper on rules versus discretion:
... economic planning is not a game against nature but, rather, a game
against rational economic agents. We conclude that there is no way control
theory can be made applicable to economic planning when expectations are
rational. (Kydland and Prescott (1977), p. 473)
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This radical statement put forward the specicity and the autonomy of macroecono-
mists with respect to the eld of control. Following this statement of such a divide as a
major scientic contribution, surveys and historiography of the time-inconsistency litera-
ture done by economists do not mention Simaan and Cruzs (1973b) original contribution,
for example Hartley (2006). Even Tabellini (2005) mentions Simaan and Cruz only in a
footnote.
The point-of-view from the eld of control is markedly di¤erent. The eld of control
was subsidized by the army in the 1940s and during the cold war. War is related to non-
cooperative dynamic games, so army funding was not limited to games against nature.
Dynamic Nash games (Isaacs (1965)) used tools related to the eld of control. Dynamic
games ourished in engineering and applied mathematics departments using control tools.
It was marginal in economics departments. Cruz, a professor of electrical and computer
engineering at university of Illinois, published with his student, Simaan, an important
result on Stackelberg dynamic games (Simaan and Cruz (1973b)). The paper was partly
funded by the US Air Force. Cruz (2019) describes the following sequence, from the point
of view of the eld of control:
R.P. Isaacs (Isaacs 1965) is the originator of di¤erential games. Y.C. Ho
(Ho 1970) claried the connection between control and di¤erential game the-
ory. C.I. Chen and J.B. Cruz (Chen and Cruz 1972) were the rst to consider
dynamic Stackelberg games [with an economic example]. M.A. Simaan and
J.B. Cruz (Simaan and Cruz 1973a, Simaan and Cruz 1973b) reframed dy-
namic Stackelberg game theory, providing mathematical proofs for various
results and showed that the Stackelberg strategies do not necessarily satisfy
Bellmans principle of optimality. This violation of the principle of optimality
was renamed as time inconsistency in economic policy (Kydland and Prescott
1977), and later Kydland and Prescott won the Nobel prize in economics in
2004 in part on the basis of their paper. M.A. Simaan and J.B. Cruz (Simaan
and Cruz 1973c) extended the dynamic Stackelberg concept to many play-
ers. J.B. Cruz (Cruz 1975) introduced the dynamic Stackelberg concept to
the economics community, and he extended the Stackelberg strategy to more
than two levels (Cruz 1978). (Cruz (2019), p.83)
Simaan and Cruz (1973b) is one of the key building blocks for Kydland and Prescotts
(1977) later success. Theoretical work done by two electrical engineers was the initial
trigger of Kydland and Prescotts (1977) and Prescotts (1977) papers denying the use of
control for stabilization policy.
Stackelberg dynamic games can consider a quadratic loss function for the leader and
the follower. In this case, their solutions are extensions of Kalmans linear quadratic
regulator solutions, solving an algebraic Riccati equations.
The leader takes into account the followers marginal conditions. However, like the
tower of control interacting with the pilot of an airplane, the leader can order the change
of the decision variables of the follower (the pilot in the cockpit). These decision variables
are jump variables. Hence, the policy maker can anchor the initial value of these jump
variables optimally, minimizing the loss function with respect to the followers decision
variable at the initial date.
In our example, let us assume that prices and ination are private sectors jump
decision variable, with unknown initial condition, instead of assuming a given initial value
0. This initial transversality condition is optimally decided by the policy maker, where
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the anchor parameter P  (Q=R) of the jump variable on predetermined variables z0 is
derived from optimization. It depends on the policy makers preferences:
00 =

@L
@

0
= 0) 00 = P (Q=R)z0 and 0t > 0 = 00 for t = 1; :: (10)
The time superscript besides a star 0 indicates it is a date-0 optimal plan. This
plan is valid for a list of future dates starting at date t = 0 which corresponds to the
time-subscript. Simaan and Cruzs (1973b) result is that if the policy maker re-optimizes
at any future period indexed by t, it contradicts the optimal plan decided at date zero:
tt = 0 < 
0
t . They conclude:
If the starting time is xed, the leaders closed-loop Stackelberg control is
the best control law (among all other admissible closed-loop controls) that he
can announce prior to the start of the game, but it does not have this same
desirable property from any other starting time (Simaan and Cruzs (1973b),
p. 625).
In a personal communication, Simaan recalls the genesis of this result:
In 1972 while I was a PhD student exploring the application of the Stackel-
berg Strategy to dynamic games, I had extensive discussions with my advisor
Professor Cruz about my observation and conclusion, at the time, that the
closed-loop controls in Stackelberg dynamic games did not satisfy Bellmans
Principle of Optimality and that the controls had to be recalculated again
at every instant of time along the optimal trajectory. Initially, he had some
doubt about the validity of this result, but after long discussions, we were
convinced. The results were published in a follow up paper on Stackelberg
dynamic games in 1973. Unfortunately, at that time, we did not make the con-
nection with macroeconomics, but fortunately, several years later, Kydland
and Prescott made the connection and published their famous 1977 paper.
Coincidentally, in 1977 I was a faculty member in electrical engineering
at the University of Pittsburgh, which is right next door to Carnegie Mellon
University. I had no idea that Kydland and Prescott were at CMU and I
am not sure if they were aware that I was at the University of Pittsburgh
about ve minutes walk from their o¢ces. I discovered their work on time
inconsistency several years later and was very happy that they received the
Nobel Prize for it in 2004. (email received 14th July 2020.)
The transplant of Simaan and Cruz (1973b) time-inconsistency of Stackelberg dy-
namic games to economics was quickly done by Kydland (1975, 1977), Prescotts Ph.D.
student at Carnegie Mellon University, where he completed his PhD in 1973 on "Decen-
tralized Economic Planning". Cass rst encouraged Kydland to expand an idea about
non-cooperative and dynamic games into a thesis (Kydland (2014)). In a paper based on
a chapter of his PhD dissertation, Kydland (1975) acknowledges his marginal contribution
with respect to Simaan and Cruz (1973a, b):
From the viewpoint of game theory this section does not really o¤er any
new results... The dominant player problem, on the other hand, has only
recently received a little attention in the game literature, and the two in-
teresting papers by Simaan and Cruz [1973a, 1973b] should be mentioned
(Kydland (1975), p. 323).
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After Kydlands (1975, 1977) citations, Kydland and Prescott (1980 p.80 and 86)
and Calvo (1978, equation A.10, p.1425 and A.21 p.1427) use the initial transversality
condition at the origin of time inconsistency without citing Simaan and Cruz (1983b,
equation 11, p.621). Calvo (1978) correctly states that:
We encounter time inconsistency even when the government attempts to
maximize the welfare of the representative individual, that is to say, in a
context where there is not a shade of malevolence or dishonesty at play. (Calvo
(1978), p. 1422)
In Simaan and Cruz (1973b), Calvo (1978) and Kydland and Prescott (1980), there is
time inconsistency and the policy maker knows the transmission mechanism parameters
which do not change over time. Therefore, he has unbiased estimates of these parameters,
as opposed to the policy maker in Kydland and Prescott (1977), section 5, which is not
related to dynamic time-inconsistency.
Although the optimal discretionary policy at date 0 is sub-optimal with respect to all
other optimal discretionary policies with an optimization starting at any future date, it
is always less sub-optimal than rules which peg policy instrument to their long run value,
for dynamic models if A > 0.
Kydland and Prescott (1980) rename the Stackelberg dynamic game as Ramsey opti-
mal policy, in reference with Ramseys (1927) static model of optimal taxation.
In his paper on optimal taxation, Ramsey (1927, p. 59) briey considers
the dynamic problem, but because it is considerably more di¢cult essentially
assumes the dynamics away. (Kydland and Prescott (1980), p.84)
Kendrick (2005) mentions Kydlands talk in 1975:
Since the idea of forward variables like those above was of obvious impor-
tance in dynamics and control, we invited Lucas to give a talk at the Society
of Economic Dynamics and Control (SEDC) conference in Cambridge, MA
in 1975. He declined to come, but Finn Kydland did accept our invitation.
Finns talk at that meeting was well attended and listened to carefully. The
reaction of the control engineer standing next to me was typical  no problem
 you just have to treat it like a game theory problem. (Kendrick (2005),
p. 15)
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) judge that Prescotts (1977) pessimism on optimal
control has been overturned:
Prescott (1977) asserted that recursive optimal control theory does not
apply to problems with this structure. This chapter and chapters 20 and 23
show how Prescotts pessimism about the inapplicability of optimal control
theory has been overturned by more recent work. The important contribu-
tion by Kydland and Prescott (1980) helped to dissipate Prescotts initial
pessimism. (Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012), chapter 19)
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) expose the optimal program in the linear quadratic case
of a Stackelberg dynamic game. This is the same optimal program as the one presented in
Simaan and Cruz (1973b), Kydland (1975, 1977), Calvo (1978) and Kydland and Prescott
(1980). More recent work only assumes a policy makers commitment constraint as
initially proposed by Calvo (1978), published the year after Prescott (1977):
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It is clear that no inconsistency arises if the government optimizes at t0,
say, and abides by the dictates of that policy for all t  t0; so one possible
proposal could be constraining the government to do just that for a given t0.
(Calvo (1978), p. 1422)
The contribution of more recent work was to forget Prescotts (1977) and Kyd-
land and Prescotts (1977) over-statement of the inapplicability of optimal control for
stabilization policy.
Finally, how large are the relative gains of re-optimization on future dates t > t0 with
respect to initial optimal policy on date t0? Firstly, if the initial shock is small and the
policy target remains close to its long run equilibrium, the optimal path hardly deviates
after re-optimization. Secondly, if the initial shock is large and if one re-optimizes soon
after, the optimal path hardly deviates. Thirdly, if the relative cost of changing the
policy instrument (R=Q) is very large or very small, the optimal path hardly deviates
after re-optimization (Chatelain and Ralf (2016)).
If there is a xed cost of future re-optimization, re-optimization is more likely to
happen (1) following large shocks 0 although one may maintain the linear-quadratic
approximation (2) in the middle of the duration of the way back to equilibrium and (3)
if R=Q  1: the cost of changing the policy instrument is of the same order of magnitude
than the cost of the volatility of the policy target.
5.2 Barro and Gordon (1983) Steady State Bias in the Policy
Makers Loss Function
As opposed to Calvos (1978) time-inconsistency in dynamic Stackelberg games, Kydland
and Prescott (1977, section 3) and Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b) assume that the
policy makers utility is di¤erent from the private sectors utility (there is a "shade of
malevolence or dishonesty at play" by the policy maker) and that the policy transmission
mechanism is a static model (A = 0).
Denition 6 Optimal discretion is such that, rstly, one assumes A = 0 in the policy
transmission mechanism, secondly the policy maker has a long run target value of the
policy target (D > 0) which is systematically di¤erent from the long-run set point
value of the policy target in the transmission mechanism, contrary to rules.
The policy target is unemployment Ut (Barro and Gordon (1983a)) or output xt
(Barro and Gordon (1983b)) and their policy instrument is ination. The transmission
parameter is a static Phillips curve: Ut = Bt with BU < 0 or xt = Bxt with Bx > 0.
We translate their model in our benchmark model with our notations: t = Bit 1 with
B < 0 and A = 0.
Proposition 3 The joint assumptions A = 0 (static model), a non-zero weight on the
volatility of th policy target Q > 0 and a distorted long run objective for the policy target
D > 0 (inationary bias) implies that optimal discretion is necessarily sub-optimal with
respect to rules which are optimal assuming A = 0 and D = 0
Proof. Optimal discretionary policy is obtained by minimizing in each period the ex-
pected loss fonction. The rst order condition is:
@
@t

Q (t   D)2 +R
t
B
2
= 2Q (t   D) + 2 R
B2
t = 0:
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As expected, this leads to a suboptimal solution denoted (D, i

D) with a policy makers
distorted steady state D > 0 when compared to the solution of rules (

D = 0, i

D = 0)
which is optimal for a static model (A = 0) with a policy makers non-distorted steady
state D = 0:
D =
Q
Q+ R
B2
D > 0 = 
 and iD =
1
B
Q
Q+ R
B2
D < 0 = i
:
The discretionary equilibrium of the policy target D increases with the steady state
inationary bias D in the central banks preference and with the weight of the policy
target Q and decreases with the weight on the policy instrument R. The same level
of D is obtained for a lower inationary bias D compensated by a higher Q=R ratio.
Assuming a zero weight (Q = 0, R > 0, D  0) on the variance of the policy target with
respect to the policy makers biased long run target, is equivalent to assume a non-zero
weight and no inationary bias (Q  0, R > 0, D = 0).
Instead of directly assuming that a conservative central banker has an exogenously
set lower inationary bias D;C in the loss function 0 < D;C < D which would be too
simple for a publication in a top journal, Rogo¤s (1985) contribution is to assume that a
conservative central banker has an exogenously lower relative weight on the policy target
Q=R for an unchanged exogenous inationary bias D in the loss function.
Barro and Gordon (1983a) mention that if ever the policy maker with a distorted
steady state (exogenous inationary bias) would choose rules ( = 0), he would have
an incentive to deviate creating surprise ination. They mention that this solution does
not hold in a rational expectations equilibrium (D, i

D).
Barro and Gordon (1983a) justify their exogenous steady state inationary bias as-
sumption by this single sentence:
In the presence of unemployment compensation, income taxation, and the
like, the natural unemployment rate will tend to exceed the e¢cient level -
that is, privately chosen quantities of marketable output and employment will
tend to be too low. (Barro and Gordon (1983a), p. 593)
Taylor, however, is not convinced by this argument:
In other well-recognized time inconsistency situations, society seems to
have found ways to institute the optional (cooperative) policy... The supe-
riority of the zero ination policy is obvious... It is therefore di¢cult to see
why the zero ination policy would not be adopted. (Taylor (1983), p.125)
Blinder (1998) comments on Barro and Gordons (1983a) positive interpretation of
their model explaining high ination during 1973-1979:
Barro and Gordon ignored the obvious practical explanations for the ob-
served upsurge in ination  the Vietnam War, the end of the Bretton-Woods
system, two OPEC shocks, and so on  and sought instead a theoretical ex-
planation for what they believed to be a systematic inationary bias in the
behaviour of central banks. (Blinder (1998), p.40).
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A version of Barro and Gordon (1983a) was soon included in graduate textbooks of
macroeconomics in order to explain Kydland and Prescotts (1977) time inconsistency.
For now four decades, which included a global disinationary trend and the emergence of
ination targeting, graduate students around the world have exams related to the unlikely
statement that central bankers have a pro-ination bias in their loss function:
Though it didnt hurt them in academia, Kydland and Prescotts timing
was exceptionally poor from a real world perspective. As mentioned earlier,
the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed sharp and painful disinations in the
US, the UK, and elsewhere. Neither Paul Volcker nor Margaret Thatcher (the
Bank of England was not independent then) succumbed to the temptation
posed by time inconsistency; they probably never even heard of it. It turned
out that Kydland, Prescott, and other academics were prescribing how to
ght the last war just as the next war was getting underway. (Blinder (2020),
p.31).
6 Taylor (1993) Translates the Rules versus Discre-
tion Controversy
The perception of rules versus discretion changed fundamentally with the introduction
of the Taylor rule in the 1990s. Like Barnett and Serletis (2017), Kendrick (2005), and
Turnovsky (2011), Taylor conrms the gains of the proponents of the policy ine¤ectiveness
claim in the 1980s:
His (Ben McCallum (1999)) lecture also describes how research work on
monetary policy rules waned considerably in the 1980s, except for the work of
small groups toiling in the vineyards. I call it dark ages in another paper;
it seemed like everyone interested in the new rational expectations methods
in the 1980s was working on real business cycle models without a role for
monetary policy. (Leeson and Taylor (2012))
Taylor refers to mainstream macroeconomists belonging to top US academic circles
in the 1980s, for example, the ones invited to NBER conferences, as well as their PhD
students. By contrast, in the Fed and in other central banks, policy advisers still used
models involving policy makers negative feedback response. But they had less and less
access to publishing their results in top academic journals. In continental Europe, in
particular in France and Belgium, macroeconomists around Drèze, Benassy and Malin-
vaud were involved in the heyday of disequilibrium macroeconomics in the 1980s. They
considered that real business cycles models were not relevant.
During the dark agesof the 1980s, Taylor followed the strategies of dissenters in
scientic controversies with the outcome described by Latour (1987, p.137): From a few
helpless occupying a few weak points, they end up controlling strongholds. His strategy
targeted policy makers at the Fed, in order to convince them that rules" can also be a
specic feedback rules".
One may be surprised that Taylor (1993) dedicated the rst section of his paper to
semantic issues. Semantic issues matter in a scientic controversy in other sciences than
mathematics (which always proceed with exact mathematical denitions).
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Friedman (1948) and Kydland and Prescott (1977) originally translated stabilization
policy ine¤ectiveness" and the xed setting of the policy instrument" into rules". They
translated negative feedback policy" into discretion". The word rules" is related to
more virtues than discretion", which has a wide range of negative polysemic connotations
such as the abuse of power or arbitrary, opportunistic, careless, thoughtless or non-
predictable random behavior.
For the proponents of stabilization policy, these negative connotations are unrelated to
the expected virtues of stabilization policy aiming to improve social welfare. For example,
Buiter (1981) translated negative feedback policy" into the oxymoron exible rules":
This paper analyses an old controversy in macroeconomic theory and pol-
icy: rules versus discretion or, more accurately, xed rules (rules without
feedback or open-loop rules) versus exible rules (contingent rules, conditional
rules, rules with feedback or closed-loop rules). (Buiter (1981), p. 647)
In their textbook, Dornbush and Fischer translated negative feedback policy" into
activist monetary rule":
The growth rate of money is high when unemployment is high and is low
when unemployment is low. That way, monetary policy is expansionary at
times of recession and contractionary in a boom. (Dornbush and Fischer
(1984), p. 343)
The xed setting of the policy instrument is translated into inactive policy" (Blan-
chard and Fischer (1989), p.582) or passive policy, which may carry the negative conno-
tations of policy makers who may be lazy and useless bureaucrats being paid for doing
nothing.
The translation of the denition of the word rule by its opposite in the controversy
is a dissenters tactical move:
Tactic four: rendering the detour invisible... People can still see the dif-
ference between what they wanted and what they got, they can still feel they
have been cheated. A fourth move is then necessary that turns the detour into
a progressive drift [e.g. activist policy, systematic policies], so that the
enrolled group still thinks that it is going along a straight line, without ever
abandoning its own interests... I should now be clear why I used the word
translation. In addition to its linguistic meaning (relating versions in one
language to versions in another one), it has also a geometric meaning (mov-
ing from one place to another). Translating interests is at once o¤ering new
interpretations of these interests and channeling people in other directions.
(Latour (1987), p. 116-117)
In the Harry Johnson lecture at the Money Macro and Finance Research Group
conference in Durham, September 1997, Taylor (1998) denes translational economics
in a more narrow sense than Latour (1987):
The process of nding ways for the research in the biology laboratories
to be applied in medicine to improve peoples health is called translational
biology. Analogously the term translational economics might usefully des-
ignate the process of nding ways to make academic research in economics
applicable to improving the performance of an economy. (Taylor (1998), p. 7)
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Taylor used his position in the Council of Economic Advisers from June 1989 to
August 1991 during the George H.W Bush administration:
As a member of the CEA I felt that I had an opportunity to move the
policy ball at least a little bit in the direction of the policy rule goal line,
an opportunity that would not exist outside the policy arena. One plan of
action was to use the public forum o¤ered by the annual Economic Report
of the President [1990] to make the case for monetary policy rules. (Taylor
(1998), p. 8-9)
In a rst step, Taylor translated Keynesian negative feedback policy into system-
atic policy:
When we wrote about policy rules in the 1990 Economic Report to the
President, for example, we said systematic policies instead of rules so as
not to confuse people who might think that a rule meant a xed setting for
the policy instrument. (Leeson and Taylor (2012))
McCallum (2015) mentions:
At the time I was a member of the Carnegie-Rochester Conferences ad-
visory board. One of our duties was to suggest fruitful topics for future
conferences. In that capacity, at the boards planning meeting for the No-
vember 1992 conference, some months earlier, I had suggested that a paper
should be commissioned that would develop some method or criterion that
would permit an outside researcher to determine whether an actual central
banks actions over some signicant span of time should be regarded as re-
sulting from a policy rule, rather than being discretionary. This suggestion
met with approval by Allan Meltzer and the other participants, and then
we quickly agreed that the best person to write the paper would be John
Taylorwho Allan subsequently contacted and signed up for the conference.
Well, as it turns out, the paper that John delivered did not actually do
this. Instead it proposed and (very e¤ectively) promoted a specic rule. So
at the time of the conference, I, evidently, must have been somewhat put o¤
by the change in focus. (This change might have been arranged with Allan;
about that I do not know.). (McCallum (2015), p.2).
Secondly, in Taylor (1993) rst section Semantic issues of a paper rst presented
in November 1992 at a meeting in Pittsburgh of the Carnegie-Rochester conference on
public policy, and then published in the resulting conference volume in the spring of 1993,
Taylor (1993) translated the negative feedback policy into its opposite in the Friedman
(1948) controversy: policy rules.
There is considerable agreement among economists that a policy rule need
not be interpreted narrowly as entailing xed settings for the policy instru-
ments. Although the classic rules versus discretion debate was usually carried
on as if the only policy rule were the constant growth rate rule for the money
supply, feedback rules in which the money supply responds to changes in un-
employment or ination are also policy rules... A policy rule is a contingency
plan that lasts forever unless there is an explicit cancellation clause. (Taylor
(1993), p. 198).
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Taylor (1993) proposed the following new denitions of rules versus discretion. He
xed rounded values of the parameters of a feedback rule which was roughly predicting
the Federal funds rate in the last six years (1987-1992):
Denition 7 Taylor (1998, 2017): Rules follow systematically a Taylor (1993) negative-
feedback rule where the real federal funds rates has a 2% set point and responds in
proportion to ination deviation from 2% and to output gap with given parameters equal
to 1/2.
it = t +
1
2
(t   2) + 1
2
xt + 2 = 1:5t + 0:5xt + 1:
Denition 8 Taylor (1998, 2017): Discretion is any other monetary policy which
deviates from a Taylor (1993) negative-feedback rule, measured by the discrepancies (or
the residuals) of funds rate with respect to Taylor (1993) rule predictions.
The discrepancies between the [Taylor rule] equation and reality could be
a measure of discretion, either for good or for bad. (Taylor (1998), p. 12)
Taylors (1993) policy paper was using a rhetorical presentation in order to convince
the Feds policy makers, not academics. A feedback rule with xed parameters can be
easily understood. His rule had soon early users among a su¢ciently large set of inuential
practitioners (in this case, at the Fed) and of private sector analysts of policy making
(Koenig et al. (2012)).
Taylors (1993) plots 24 quarterly observations of Fed funds rate from 1987 to 1992
and its forecast according to his rule. No statistical tests are presented. The rounded
parameters of his rule seem arbitrary (the formal constraint is that they involve only
the numbers 1 and 2). There is no information on the transmission mechanism, which
is a crucial information for designing negative feedback policy rule. There is no mention
of reverse causality and nor of endogeneity issues related to this forecast. The paper
was published in a conference volume by invitation along with comments by McCallum
(1993), so that peer-review was limited.
We mention Lucas, Kydland and Prescott overstated their results in the rules versus
discretion controversy. Taylor (1993) may have overstated the response of Feds fund rate
to ination during 1987-1992 in his policy rule. Lets check the robustness of Taylors
(1993) rule estimating this policy rule with currently available and revised quarterly data
from FRED database for ination and congressional budget o¢ce (CBO) output gap, still
for 24 observations from 1987 to 1992. The ination rule parameter estimate is below
one (0:75) instead of 1:5 in the Taylor rule, so that the Taylor principle is not satised.
The output gap rule parameter estimate is 0:75 instead of 0:5. The share of unexplained
variance related to discretion is 30%.
Ination has a very low persistence with a very low autocorrelation coe¢cient:  =
0:4. By contrast, Fed funds rate and CBO output gap are highly persistent, close to unit
root with i = 0:96 and x = 0:935. A regression of Fed funds rate on its lagged value
and current output gap leads to an R2 = 962%: the share of unexplained variance of the
policy rule related to discretion is less than 4%. Including ination in the regression only
increases the R2 by 0:0013%, which may correspond to overtting. Ination persistence
is low because of private sectors negative feedback mechanism and because of a divine
coincidence where leaning against output gap uctuations stabilizes the component of
ination correlated with output gap. A policy makers instrument should respond more
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to more persistent target variables (Ashley et al. (2020)). Rounding the gures of the
estimates in order to introduce the number 2 for a key parameter, one may have proposed
an alternative denition of "rules":
Denition 9 Rules follows systematically a persistence-dependent negative feedback rule
where Fed funds rate responds to its lagged value and to current output gap, with Feds
funds rate long run sensitivity to the output gap equal to 2.
it = 0:8it 1 + 0:4xt with 2 =
0:4
1  0:8
Denition 10 Discretion is any other monetary policy which deviates from this per-
sistence negative-feedback rule, measured by the discrepancies of funds rate with respect
to the forecast of persistence-dependent rule. For the period 1987-1992, discretion corre-
sponds to the unexplained share of variance is around 5% in the estimation of the policy
rule.
The unexpected side-e¤ect of the interest paid by policy makers to Taylors interest
rate rule was fed back three years later into academia with citations in academic papers
starting in 1996. These papers soon led to the emergence of the three equation new-
Keynesian theoretical model where the Taylor rule is the third equation (Kerr and King
(1996), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999)). Google Scholar citations of Taylor (1993)
increased by at least 40 citations each year from 1997 to 2008. The success of the
Taylor (1993) rule tilted the balance to formerly discretion in the original rules versus
discretion controversy, with the gain of the original negative feedback discretion" being
renamed rule".
Essentially, when the usefulness of discretion was rediscovered, the notion
of rule got the credit... This peculiar re-denition of rule not only renders
the terminology bogus, but also the substance of rules vs discretion Mark I.
(Bibow (2004), p. 559).
The Taylor rule marked the return of classic control into top level macroeconomic
research. However, advisors using models at the Fed never stopped using feedback rules.
Even though optimal rules were considered too complex to be disclosed to the press, forty
years later after the initial use of optimal control with the Fed FMP model, Feds optimal
control approach in the FRB/US model made the headlines of nancial newspapers,
following Yellens (2012) speech. Yellen was at the time Vice Chair of the board of
governors of the Federal Reserve System:
First, the FRB/US models projections of real activity, ination, and in-
terest rates are adjusted to replicate the baseline forecast values. Second, a
search procedure is used to solve for the path of the federal funds rate that
minimizes the value of an assumed loss function, allowing for feedback of
changes in the federal funds rate from baseline to real activity and ination.
For the purposes of the exercise, the loss function is equal to the cumulative
discounted sum from 2012:Q2 through 2025:Q4 of three factorsthe squared
deviation of the unemployment rate from 5-1/2 percent, the squared deviation
of overall PCE ination from 2 percent, and the squared quarterly change in
the federal funds rate. The third term is added to damp quarter-to-quarter
movements in interest rates. (Yellen (2012), p. 16).
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7 Conclusion
The present paper studied the use of control theory in macroeconomic models with a spe-
cial emphasis on the debate of monetary policy and  in particular  the question of rules
versus discretion. Whereas the 1960s were dominated by a belief in the e¤ectiveness
of discretionary stabilization policy, the rhetorics changed in the subsequent years. The
Lucas (1976) critique and Kydland and Prescotts (1977) time inconsistency convinced
a su¢cient number of macroeconomists that the negative-feedback mechanism of classic
and optimal control cannot be used for stabilization policy, whereas it should be used
to model the private sector. Using rhetorical over-statements in their nal conclusions,
helped to convince their readers of the stabilization policy ine¤ectiveness claim". These
inuential papers paved the way to Kydland and Prescotts (1982) real business cycle
theory, assuming that stabilization policy had no e¤ect on US postwar business cycles.
Furthermore, these inuential papers succeeded in delaying the expected fast trans-
plant of the robust control, linear quadratic Gaussian estimations and Ramsey optimal
policy in the 1980s to nearly twenty years. Our analysis stops in 1993 with the emer-
gence of the Taylor (1993) rule, which contributed to the revision and the decline of the
stabilization policy ine¤ectiveness claim. At the end of the nineties, negative-feedback
rules in backward-looking models were used at the Fed, and Ramsey optimal policy and
robust optimal control gained interest in monetary policy analysis.
Also in the mid-1980s, however, another controversy started, namely the debate com-
mitment versus discretion. As a starting point the model of Oudiz and Sachs (1985)
can be seen. They modeled a policy makers behavior who re-optimizes in each period, as
if he is replaced by another policy maker at the end of the period. As this policy maker
lives only one period, he sets a probability equal to zero to the expectations of the policy
target. Omitting expectations, he does a static optimization of an otherwise dynamic
process for the policy target. Phillips (1954) already mentioned that static optimization,
when wrongly applied to a dynamic model, can lead to a positive feedback rule which
implies exploding paths of the policy target. Therefore, a set of additional mathematical
restrictions are added on the private sectors behavior in order to eliminate these unstable
paths (Chatelain and Ralf (2021)). Oudiz and Sachs (1985) solution was initially labeled
time-consistent" policy. At the beginning of the 1990s, it became the new benchmark
model describing discretion" (Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999)).
The shift from the original denitions of rules" versus discretion" to these models
of commitment" versus discretion" brought semantic issues. Firstly, the mathemat-
ics of this new discretion" model implies a state-contingent positive feedback rule".
Conversely, Ramsey optimal policy under commitment has a state-contingent negative
feedback rule", which corresponds to the original denition of discretion" by Friedman
(1960).
When discussing discretionary policies, a macroeconomist involved into policy making
at the end of the seventies may misunderstand a macroeconomist having done his PhD
at the end of the nineties. The older macroeconomist will describe Volckers policy as
discretionary policy, with a strong negative feedback e¤ect against ination. The next
generation macroeconomist will describe Volckers policy as commitment (able to sharply
decrease the expectations of ination) instead of discretion.
In a second approach, Currie and Levine (1985) dened a simple rule" dynamic path
including a proportional feedback rule when the policy target is a jump variable without
an initial condition. Although the policy maker does not optimize, this equilibrium solu-
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tion can be a reduced form of Oudiz and Sachs (1985) discretion" model (Chatelain and
Ralf (2020b)). Their simple rule" solution also implies positive feedback rule parameters
and exploding paths of the policy target. As in Oudiz and Sachs (1985) solution, a set
of additional mathematical restrictions on the private sectors behavior are assumed in
order to eliminate these unstable paths (Chatelain and Ralf (2020a and 2020b)).
Time-consistent" and simple rule" dynamic paths with positive-feedback rule para-
meters advocate the opposite of control which favors negative feedback rule parameters for
stabilization policy as obtained with Ramsey optimal policy under commitment. Other
than in the above discussed rules paradigm with no policy feedback in Friedman (1960),
Kydland and Prescott (1977, 1982), Barro and Gordon (1983a)) due to condence in the
stabilizing force of the private sector, in the subsequent time-consistent" or simple rule"
paradigm, positive feedback rules were favored with a set of mathematical restrictions
on the private sectors behavior, eliminating unstable paths, as in Clarida, Gali, Gertler
(1999), among many other papers. In both cases, macroeconomists lost control. The
latter story, however, deserves to be treated in a separate paper.
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FIGURES NOT FOR PUBLICATIONS: 
Section 2.1 (Self stabilizing markets): Figure 1 : Adam Smith (1776) feedback of supply on demand 
(De Rosnay (1979), The Macroscope, p.31). 
 
Section 2.1, Figure 2: Block diagram for Smith feedback of supply on demand (Mayr (1971, p.11). 
 
  
Section 2.1. Figures 3a,b,c in Ezekiel (1938, p. 264) cobweb, Case 1 non diverging cycle and Case 2 
diverging cycle cases are counter examples with positive feedback of market mechanism. Case 3 
converging case with negative feedback mechanism of supply as in Adam Smith (1776) 
  
 
Section 3.1 (Classic control). Figure 4 : Signal-flow block diagram of a Keynesian model by Tustin 
(1953). 
 
  
Section 3.1. Video “Making Money Flow, the MONIAC” Phillips Machine at the Central Bank of New 
Zealand (09/09/2017): 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rAZavOcEnLg 
Section 3.1 (Classic control). Figure 5 : Signal flow block diagram in Taylor (1968) master thesis. The 
blocks into dash lines correspond to proportional integrative derivative (PID) feedback rules. 
 
  
Section 3: Video: Interview with Professor Kalman on the occasion of the Nordic Process Control 
Award 2015 (21/01/2015). At 20:00 “Everything depends on how accurately you measure the thing 
that you want to control”. At 21:40 “Modelling is sometimes done a priori, you think is should be 
like that, but that’s useless unless you have real measurements, that’s where the main problem is… 
the basic issue is the accuracy of the measurements”. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRS9msPlVYU 
 
Section 3: Transplants of the three stages of control: Figure 6a and b: A picture history of control 
(Zhou, Doyle, Glover (1995, figure 1.1, p.35)) on the left replicated in Hansen and Sargent (2008) on 
the right who changed the Greek letter μ by the Greek letter θ. The post-modern gentleman is for 
robust control. 
 
  
Section 4.3. Optimal Saving in Real Business Cycles Model. Figure 7 : Ramsey (1928) feedback 
mechanism of optimal saving as a reservoir model of the stock of wealth (De Rosnay, The 
Macroscope (1979)). 
 
  
Section 5.1: Dynamic Stackelberg Games. Figure 8a,b,c : Five equicost contours for static two-
players contrasting Nash versus Stackelberg game (Chen and Cruz (1972, figure 2), replicated in 
Simaan and Cruz (1973a, figure 4) with 4 equicost countours and in Kydland (1975, figure 1) with 3 
equicost contours. 
Figure 7 : Chen and Cruz (1972) : 5 equicosts          Figure 8 : Simaan and Cruz (1973a) : 4 equicosts  
 
Figure 9 : Kydland (1975) : 3 equicost contours. 
 
  
Section 6: The return of classic control with a proportional negative feedback interest rate rule, 
soon to become the “Taylor rule”. Figure 9 : Federal funds rate and the forecast of the Taylor rule 
using 24 quarterly observations between 1987Q1 and 1992Q4. The gap between the two curves 
corresponds to the new definition of discretion proposed by Taylor (1993). 
 
